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# Violence in the Arab Revolutions: The Paradigmatic Case of Egypt

Farhad Khosrokhavar[1]

1) Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, France

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# Violence in the Arab Revolutions: The Paradigmatic Case of Egypt

Farhad Khosrokhavar
*Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales*

## Abstract

Arab Revolutions promoted non-violence (*selmiyah*) at their outset, in conjunction with the dignity of the citizen (*karama*). These mottoes did not resist for a long time against the violence of the Deep State, the intolerance of the revolutionary actors, and the geopolitics of the region, with the notable exception of Tunisia, where geopolitics were not paramount. This article aims at analyzing the manifold features of violence during the transitional period, from the ousting of the President Mubarak in February 2011 up to the third anniversary of the Revolution in January 25, 2014. It purports to show that grass root level actors (the Black Bloc made of Football fans, the secular youth building up the social movement Tamarrod…) and institutional ones (the Judiciary, the security forces representing the Interior Ministry, and the military at the highest level) rejected the new President from the Muslim Brotherhood. The latter acted in an inept and partisan manner, dialogue becoming impossible and violent rupture becoming unavoidable. The two types of violence (from below and from the Deep State) made democratization impossible. The door was opened for a new period of authoritarianism under the aegis of the army.The article does not deal with the geopolitics and their role in the radicalization within the Egyptian society.

**Keywords:** Egyptian Revolution, violence, secular movement, Islamist movement, Muslim Brotherhood

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# Violencia en las Revoluciones Árabes: El Caso Paradigmático de Egipto

Farhad Khosrokhavar
*Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales*

**Resumen**

Las revoluciones árabes en sus inicios promovieron la no violencia (*selmiyah*), conjuntamente con la dignidad de la ciudadanía (*karama*). Estos lemas no duraron mucho tiempo ante la violencia del Viejo Estado, la intolerancia de los actores revolucionarios y la situación geopolítica de la región, con la excepción notable de Túnez, donde la geopolítica no jugó un papel tan destacable. Este artículo pretende analizar las múltiples caras de la violencia en Egipto durante el periodo de transición, que va de la salida del presidente Mubarak en febrero de 2011 al tercer aniversario de la Revolución el 25 de enero de 2014. Intenta mostrar que los actores de base (el Black Bloc formado por fans de futbol, el aumento de jóvenes seculares, el movimiento Tamrrod...) e institucionales (la judicatura, las fuerzas de seguridad representantes del Ministerio del Interior, y los militares al más alto nivel) rechazaron el nuevo presidente de los Hermanos Musulmanes. Éste último actuó de una manera inepta y partidista, el diálogo fue imposible y la ruptura violenta fue inevitable. Los dos tipos de violencia (desde abajo y desde el Viejo Estado) imposibilitaron la democratización. Se abrió la puerta a un nuevo periodo autoritario bajo la tutela de las fuerzas armadas. El artículo no se adentra en la geopolítica ni en su papel en la radicalización de la sociedad egipcia.

**Palabras clave:** Revolution Egipcia, violencia, movimiento secular, movimiento islamista, Hermanos Musulmanes

## The Change in the Status of Violence

**T**he status of violence largely changed within the Arab Revolutions during the last three years, from the end of 2010 when the Jasmin Revolution broke up in Tunisia and the Egyptian 25 January Revolution put an end to Mubarak regime up to the beginning of 2014, after a military coup put and end to the constitutional yet inept presidency of Morsi, the first legally elected President in Egypt.

The first Arab Revolutions, the Tunisian and Egyptian, had a dual leitmotiv based on non-violence and peacefulness, crystallized in the Arabic word *selmiyah* as well as the dignity of the citizen *(karamah)*. Violence was the *modus operandi* of the Power that Be. Even during the Jasmin Revolution (Tunisia) and January 25 Revolution (Egypt) violence could be qualified as "moderate", taking into account the standards of the region and the long tradition of State repression in most of the Muslim world: in Tunisia, the death toll was around 338 people (Associated Press, 2012), and in Egypt, 846[1] during the revolution proper. This relatively limited number of deaths was in part due to the swift overthrow of the autocratic governments (28 days in Tunisia, 18 days in Egypt). The precipitate Tunisian-Egyptian model of revolution was not replicated in the other cases and the death toll was by far higher: in Yemen, more than 2.000 up to the departure of the President Ali Abdullah Saleh (Al-Haj, 2012), in Libya, around 30.000 (Karin, 2011), and the civil war in Syria caused more than 100.000 deaths up to June 2013 (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, 2013), and the end of the crises in the Arab world is not in sight. In some cases, after the overthrow of the old regime, the death toll continued to rise, as in Egypt where few hundreds died after the end of the Old Regime, before the military coup of the 3rd July 2013. After the Coup d'Etat, over 80 Morsi supporters were killed in a clash with the Republican Guards on 8 July, and over 70 were killed during protests towards the end of the month (Crisis Watch, 2013).

In Egypt, the symbolic status of violence changed after the revolution, and one could distinguish three major periods, with distinct features:
- the period from February 10, 2011 (the ousting of Mubarak) up to the election of the President Morsi in June 2012. During this period, the armed

forces ruled the country through the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF).

- the period extending from the election of Morsi to his overthrow, the elected Parliament being dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood's political wing Freedom and Justice Party, and the President coming from its ranks.

- the period beginning with the overthrow of Morsi by the military, in alliance with a large part of the secular opposition parties joined by the Salafi Nour party, Ahmed el-Tayeb the head of al-Azhar Mosque, and the Coptic Pope Tawadros, after large demonstrations launched by the opposition and a new born association, Tamarrod that alleged having gathered millions of signatures for the demise of the President. In this period, a new chapter opened up in terms of violence: the military joined by the opposition alleged that the dismissal of the late president was a legitimate act of insubordination in continuity with the spirit of January 25 Revolution, in order to prevent Morsi's dictatorship under the banner of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). The followers of the deposed President rejected this view and called his removal a military coup. Their reaction has been so far sit-ins and large demonstrations in large towns and cities, in particular in Cairo and Alexandria, the military shooting and killing more than hundred people and maiming many hundreds. Violence changed in its nature: it was not anymore due to the inability of the Muslim Brotherhood's representatives to tackle the unruly situation after the revolution, but to a new type of government willing to impose its diktat to the rest of the society. The new type of violence put into question the claim by the opposition to follow a democratic line of conduct, the military yielding the ultimate power. At the same time, repression by the military made the MB a "martyr political institution", its status changing from and arrogant, inept and "total" organization into a persecuted, unjustly mistreated human group. There was a "symbolic rupture" in the status of the MB based on the rapid change of mood and vision in the revolutionary situations: during the interim period when the Egyptian army ruled the country, its incompetence and defying attitude caused it to be abhorred by the people and in particular, the "Tahrir youth". After the election of Morsi, a year after, the same vilified army became a savior and many of the Tahrir youth members called for the military intervention under the banner of the Tamarrod movement. More

generally, the rupture in the general mood in Egypt resulted from the situation of instability and opaque political future that induced many young people to change rapidly their view on the major actors of the revolution: the revolutionary youth, the MB hierarchy, the opponents….

## The Three Periods of the Egyptian Revolution

In Tunisia and Egypt, before and during the revolution the most visible revolutionary actors were secular[2] in their outlook, young in age, belonging mostly to the middle classes, some to the Arab Diaspora in the West. In Egypt, the protesters gathering at Tahrir Square in Cairo were mostly secular Muslims, jointly celebrating prayers with Christians (Copts) in order to show their non-sectarian view of citizenship (International Crisis Group, 2011).

After the overthrow of the authoritarian regime, a new type of activist became prominent. In the first period, the protesters were anti-authoritarian and pro-democracy, whereas many post-revolutionary actors regarded themselves as engagé Muslims, identifying with either the Muslim Brotherhood, or the Salafis. These actors came as a shock to the predominantly "secular" and "liberal" Muslims for whom religion was not the major issue in the mobilizations that ended the autocratic rule (Khosrokhavar & Nikpey, 2009)[3]. Members of the Muslim Brotherhood were more familiar to the public, the organization having had a long history of political opposition, dating back to 1928 when it was founded by Hassan el Banna. Salafis were more of a surprise as social and political activists to many people (the MB included), since under Mubarak the group defined itself as nonpolitical, and promoted Islamization from below, rejecting political activity as illegitimate against the Islamic ruler, adopting thus a quietist version of Islam.

Compared to the secular, modernist youth that was at the heart of the incipient revolutionary movement, the MB and Salafi actors presented another picture of the revolution. The actors of the first period gradually became convinced that the revolution "was stolen" by the Islamists who in their eyes betrayed the ideals of the popular uprising (LeVine, 2011).

Political parties became more autonomous towards their respective religious associations, as for instance in gender equality, MB inclining towards the limitation of women's freedom in the name of religious orthodoxy, whereas the Freedom and Justice party, the political branch of MB, took a much more ambivalent stance (Kirkpatrick & El Sheikh, 2013). Secular, liberal parties denounced the Islamists' dichotomy between their political and religious stance as hypocrisy and double game.

After the presidential elections in Egypt, in which Morsi from the MB became the head of the State, in less than a year a process of polarization set in. Political opposition, in many ways divided, was able to wield a semblance of unity under the banner of an alliance, the National Salvation Front, rejecting Morsi's rule and finding no common language with him to salvage democracy. Morsi's presidency was marked by the lack of dialogue with the opposition, the refusal to find compromise with it on the new constitution and on the "ruling style" of the new government. In November 2012 he issued a Presidential decree granting him temporarily powers reminiscent of the Mubarak era, beyond the reach of any court within the prevailing juridical system. The decree made it possible to draft, through an Assembly dominated by the MB, to hastily draft a constitution that was rejected by the opposition as being too much dominated by the MB Islamism and too inauspicious towards religious minorities (the Copts) and women's freedom.

Thus initial mutual suspicion at the beginning of Morsi's presidency gave way to utter distrust and frontal rejection, Morsi's inability to rule with respect to the political continuity of the government being brandished by the opposition as utter signs of failure by the MB, not only to promote democracy, but also, to assure the management of the bureaucracy: the contradictory rules set by Morsi as to his rights to yield absolute power before revoking it partially in November 2012, then the question of bombing Ethiopia for the Dam being built on Nile, a discussion that was supposed to be secret but was shown on TV... (Egypt Independent, 2013).

As for the personal freedom, many cases of police torture, denial of habeas corpus, arbitrary sentences (Bassem Youssef, the star of the satirical TV show El Bernameg, The Program, was prosecuted for having maligned the President in January 2013), street violence against the protestors and

other breaches of the law were recorded on an almost daily basis by the media or through the blogs. MB was accused of attempting at "brotherizing" (putting under the aegis of the Muslim Brotherhood) the educational sector (Abdel-Hamid, 2013). Secular women were also suspicious of the MB presidency of attempting at reducing their rights in the name of an orthodox Islamic view (Kirckpatrick & El Sheikh, 2013). On the international Women's Rights Day, March the 8th, demonstrations were held against the MB statements putting into question the legal equality of men and women in the name of the religion, after Ikhwanweb, the official website of the MB criticized a United Nations' text on violence against women, characterizing it as a cultural invasion by the West against Muslim countries (Frémont, 2013).

Intellectuals protest over the "Islamization" of the culture by the MB ministers, showing their suspicion over the government's bias against secular values in the name of which, they believed, the Egyptian revolution was made.

The MB government purported to curtail the power of the judges, many of whom were suspected of sympathy towards the remnants of the Old Regime (the "Folul") or the secular opposition. The Shura Council, dominated by the government, endeavored to limit the power of the judiciary whose members refused to abide by the new restrictions imposed on the judicial authority on May 2013.

Many major artists rebelled against the newly appointed Minister of Culture Alaa Abdel Aziz who had removed Ines Abdel Dayem, the head of the Cairo Opera House, and Salah el-Meligy, the head of the Applied arts Department at the ministry, holding a sit-in inside the ministry on June 5, 2013, demanding his dismissal (Iskander, 2013). In the same fashion, students, long time allies of the MB under Mubarak regime, reject the government's rule in the name of their new democratic vision. In the election of the students' trade union on March 2013, the MB lost its majority to the "liberals" (Al-Naggar, 2013).

Many districts in the major towns and cities take the bits in their hands. In Port Saeed, on March the 3rd, in clashes with the protestors, three policemen were killed, the army taking the sides of the demonstrators and separating them from the security forces. In Alexandria, on March 29,

demonstrations swept the governorates against the MB crackdown on freedom and the recent interrogation of opposition activists. The supporters of the MB clashed with the demonstrators in a district of Alexandria, Sidi Gaber, in the evening, both sides using Molotov cocktails and stones. Violence erupted as well in another district of Alexandria against the MB headquarters. In Suez, activists agathered in Arbaeen Square afther Friday prayers, to demand the prosecutor general's resignation and the restriction of freedoms. In Kafr al-Sheikh City, Dostur Party and Kefaya Movement members staged a protest (MENA, 2013). In Nasr City, April 6 Youth Movement staged a protest in front of Interior Minister Mohamed Ibrahim's home, and four of its members were arrested (Al-Youm, 2013). The same was repeated in many other towns, denouncing the MB policies, the muzzling of freedom and the MB's appointment of authorities with no competence or allegiance to the MB. Clashes between the pro and anti-Morsi erupt in Alexandria on April the 5th 2013, each side hurling stones against the other, security forces firing teargas to disperse them. Protesters called on the military to return to power and remove Morsi from office (Al-Youm, 2013).

On the whole, the period after the Presidential elections was one of the most troublesome in the history of Egypt. In terms of demonstrations, between January and May, Egypt witnessed 5.544 demonstrations, the highest number in the world. In May alone, 1.300 protest movements were recorded, an average of two protests an hour, 42 a day, and 325 a week, according to the democracy index published by the International Development Center (Egypt Independent, 2013). During the Morsi's presidency, 9.427 protests were recorded (Taha, 2013). This seminal period as the transition from the old authoritarian to a new political system was interspersed with many disillusionments on the part of the activists who strongly came to believe that the revolution was betrayed by the MB, and the solution was another revolution, toppling Morsi from power. The widening gap between the anticipations and the political reality made a stable political system almost impossible, every social group finding fault with it, students, workers, jobless people, middle class seculars, the political elite with the exception of the MB members, secular women, young activists…

Two types of protest movements took place, each sapping the fledging democracy: large scale protest movements and small one's called by the authorities, in a derogatory manner, the small-group protests (*ihtijajat fi'awiya*), in reference to working class movements, and the large demonstrations (Sallam, 2011). The most fragile people (working class, peasants) witnessed their incomes dramatically decreasing due to the regression of the economy. Authorities referred to the small-scale protest movements based on special interests (corporatist interests) to characterize those advancing demands related to the redistribution of wealth (higher wages, improved working conditions…). After the Egyptian revolution, authorities, be it the army or the MB leadership following Morsi's election, denounced these claims as anti-economic, accusing labor movement as undermining the fragile post-revolutionary economy. This is due in part to the fact that after the revolution, from May 2011 up to April 2012 the total number of labor protests rose to 1.137 cases, almost twice as the 584 protests in the previous year (Abdalla, 2012). According to another set of data, the Egyptian labor strikes and protests during the year 2012 rose to 3.800, most of which occurred after the election of Morsi (Ibrahim, 2013). The rising expectations due to the revolution as well as the frustration of the working class people in conjunction with the deterioration of the general situation of the national economy embittered many sectors of the Egyptian labor against Morsi. Added to the revolutionary youth's deep mistrust of the MB and the deteriorating economic situation, the road was opened to the military coup.

## Typology of Violence

After the Egyptian revolution, street violence in different forms spread in many towns and cities. One can propose a typology of it.

### Violence against Women

The distinguishing feature of the Arab Revolutions is not so much that women took part in them. They did so since long ago, for instance in the Algerian independence movement (1954–1962), in which official estimates

put them at around 3% (about 11,000) of the total number of fighters. Some women fighters like Djamila Boupacha achieved international fame. But they did not don the status of a leader, even at the local level, being mainly foot soldiers or grass root activists. The situation changed with the new Arab Revolutions in which some women achieved the status of local or even national leaders. In Egypt Asma Mahfouz became one of the few street leaders, even before the protest movement that led to the overthrow of Mubarak in January 2011. In Yemen, Tawakul Karman, a journalist activist, became one of the opposition leaders against President Saleh. She won the Nobel Peace Price for her global action.

The paradox of women's place in the revolutionary periods in Egypt (but also Tunisia) is that many female participants played a significant role, achieved individual fame and showed capacity for leadership during the protest movement proper that led to the overthrow of the despotic governments but did not translate it into political organizations that could defend their cause against the Islamic patriarchy. Women, individually speaking, were present not only as foot soldiers, but also as leading figures (Al Jazeera, 2011). Organizationally, however, they were weak and had no say in the political matters, due to their lack of close ties with political parties that might defend their cause. Individually strong, collectively weak, the new generation of women was at best fragile in the political aftermath of the Arab Spring, although they were highly visible and conscious of their revolutionary role in bringing down autocracy in the initial street protests.

The scarcity of women as social actors in the Arab world, be they secular or Islamist, is related to the patriarchal prejudices, but also to their own inability to build up prominence within the political structures and parties. Political leaders do not consider them as assets to defend (Daily Motion, 2012), since they have not been collectively active within associations and political groupings on the political scene.

In the parliamentary elections after the Egyptian Revolution, women held 2% of the seats, down from the 12% in the last elections held under Mubarak (Fadel & Hassieb, 2012). But the 2010 elections were rigged according to many contenders, the outcome being still perceived by secular women as a positive step towards the recognition of their status as citizens. Institutionally, the Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions seem to have pushed

secular women towards a regressive political and social status, whereas they heightened at the same time their self-awareness as citizens. The number of women in the parliament dwindled after the revolution and women felt they were loosing their gains in terms of legal equality at the hands of the Islamists. Still, there were few exceptions and a beginning of self-awareness that might bear its fruits in the future (Eriksen, 2011).

Violence against women began before the overthrow of the Old regime. In Egypt, women were molested by thugs (Baltajiya), the army submitted them to virginity tests (Ortiz, 2011), and female journalists were mistreated in order to intimidate them, be they from the Diaspora, or Egyptians. In June 2011, the popular writer Mona Eltahawy brought to light the issue as part of a strategy by the military hierarchy to prevent women from participating in the protest activities. The case of Samira Ibrahim, the 25 year old Egyptian human rights activist became widely known after she filed a legal case against the military.

In reaction to the violence against them, women demonstrated, in particular in Cairo, close to the symbolic Tahrir square, to protest against military rule and the harsh treatment of female protesters by the security forces. Many men joined them on December 20, 2011 out of sympathy for them[4].

After the revolution, Salafis pushed toward the exclusion of women from the public sphere. Women Salafis became involved in promoting Sharia (Islamic law) and putting pressure on those women who asked for gender equality, violence against activist women finding tacit approval among them.

In the mobilization by Tamarrod and the opposition political parties against Morsi's presidency, women did play a significant role, but still, they were not able to convert it into political clout, partly awed by the global movement against Morsi, partly divided between Islamists and secular, family dependent, unable to build up autonomous feminist groups with the exception of small groups within the secular women.

Another factor favoring violence against women was their massive appearance on the public sphere during the Arab revolutions. Since Salafis became politicized as well and sought to appear on the same public sphere, their first acts of self-vindication was violence against women who "dared" dispute them their primacy by breaking down the barriers with men. Their

violence took varied forms, physical, psychological and moral. The army too, was keen to resend women to their homes in order to violently dispute with men the hegemony. Women, present on the public sphere, were trouble-makers, those who disputed the gender frontiers and therefore, put male tradition in question. Post-revolutionary male actors usually take to heart the reassignment of women to a less prominent place in terms of visibility, so as to exclusively occupy themselves the public sphere and give their hegemony a symbolic basis. In Egypt, virginity tests against women, their rape, their mistreatment during and after the demonstrations, all these actions had a common denominator: pushing back women to the private sphere and restoring the old order, threatened by women's meteoric emergence in Tahrir Square. The function of violence, in this case, in the four phases of the Egyptian revolution (overthrowing Mubarak, the transition period under the aegis of the army, Morsi's reign, and the coup d'Etat against him) was to push back women to their previous places and cleanse the public sphere of them. Women, on the other hand, had a relatively easy game to assert themselves during the revolution proper, but they did not build up adequate mechanisms (political parties, NGOs, clubs…) strong enough to defend their cause against the Salafis, the army and all those institutions that militate against gender equality.

**Sectarian Violence**

In Egypt, sectarian violence primordially expresses itself through the opposition between the Islamists and the Christian minority (the Copts) who make up around 10% of the population, and to a lesser degree, with tiny minorities, Shias and Bahais. The roots of the tension are old but the role of modern politics in igniting it is undeniable (Osman, 2013). During Sadat's presidency, Islamist groups who targeted the Copts were used as a means to fight against leftist activism. In 1981, during his reign, 81 Copts were killed in the Cairo working-class neighborhood, Zawiya al-Hamra. During Mubarak's presidency, Islamist groups were severely repressed but Copts became somehow hostage to the regime that infused them with a sense of insecurity in order to assure their obedience. The fear of Islamists was further used to insure the Copts' support to the regime. In the post-

revolutionary era, the attacks against the Copts were initiated by the Salafis, but in some cases, the army was directly involved, as in 9-10 October 2011 demonstrations, when the army attacked Coptic protesters near the Maspero state TV building, 28 people being killed, most of them Copts (Carr, 2011).

After the January 25 Revolution, sectarian violence erupted again by the Salafis will to impose an ultra-orthodox version of Islam. But violence was specific in each event, involving the police and more generally, the security forces, the army, the sympathizers of the Salafis, the Muslim Brotherhood, the Copts, and radicalized groups on all sides. The case of Khosous, a town in the Delta governorate of Qalyubia, shows this complexity, once we look at it in detail (Afify, 2013). There, sectarian clashes erupted on April the 5th, 2013, spilling over the next days to other towns and cities. In Khosous, Christians regarded the police as not protecting them, most of the time withdrawing from the scenes of violence rather than assisting them against the assailants. On the day of the incident, two coffee shops were entirely destroyed and many buildings bore scorch marks. The stories and the interpretations of the people were different, influenced by their identification with one side or the other, and their presence at one moment or another, at the scene of the violence. In most cases of sectarian violence in Egypt, personal conflict between few people turns into a sectarian street clash and escalate into an all-out attack. The fight might be between two individuals on petty affairs, but it can become a clash between a Muslim and a Christian. On Friday, April the 5th, a small incident swell progressively and two days later, on Sunday, ended up in the large scale attack on St Mark's Coptic Cathedral in Cairo's Abbassiya district.

In many cases, a family or a group of people are identified as being at the core of the conflict. On April 5, the family of the lawyer Samir Iskandar, formerly affiliated with the Mubarak regime, was involved in a dispute involving Christians. A Muslim was killed. Then, Muslims in the area attacked and killed four Christians, apparently at random. According to eyewitnesses, a Muslim man harassing a Christian woman set off the feud. For a third group of eyewitnesses, Muslims were provoked by a drawing of a cross on an Islamic center, belonging to Al-Azhar. A fourth group put the blame on thugs from outside the district who created the turmoil against the Christians. A fifth group, made of women who lived in the corner and had

witnessed the clashes from their beginning, alleged that Farouk Awad, Iskandar's cousin, who lived in a building facing the Al-Azhar's Islamic Institute where the clashes began, shouted at a group of children playing with a can of paint in the adjacent building. Their drawings on the building close to the Islamic Institute bore names and nicknames like Mostafa and a sign close to a swastika that children drew without knowledge of its meaning. Children refused to listen to Awad and he became furious, starting to fire his gun in the air in an attempt to scare them away, accidentally shooting a Muslim bystander who died later on. A woman yelled in the street that her son was shot and in a few minutes, a massacre happened. Weapons being available to the people and the security forces being absent, the feud escalated. Muslims began targeting randomly Christians around the town, capturing a Christian and setting him ablaze in the middle of the street.

Then rumor was spread that a cross was put by Christians on the Islamic Institute. The authorities, without inspecting the scene of the events, officially stated the story of the cross on the building as the cause of the deadly events.

Another interpretation by the people put the blame on an unknown individual who transformed a feud between two families involving an accidental shooting into a sectarian conflict. The ninth interpretation claimed that it was the local mosque's imam who announced the death of the Muslim victim over a loudspeaker and urged Muslims to massacre Christians. Rumormongering and local tensions play a significant role in these feuds, the authorities becoming most of the time one of the rumormongers, rather than an impartial arbiter.

Clashes in Khosous were renewed on Sunday evening with the attacks on the funeral of the four Christian victims of Khosous at the Abbassiya cathedral in Cairo. The clash at the cathedral transformed  local sectarian dispute into a national one. Security forces fired tear gas into the Cathedral and two deaths resulted in the afternoon, continuing into the night. In Khosous, on Sunday, Muslims and Christians became entangled in a battle with weapons on both sides, each targeting the business owned by the other. The police fled the scene, according to the eyewitnesses, and the lights in the areas were cut off.

The official reaction to the clashes by Essam al-Haddad, one of the spokesmen of the Presidency, put the blame on the Christians for igniting violence in both Khosous and Abbasiya, espousing the argument that Christians painted an insulting graffiti on the wall of an al-Azhar building in Khosous.

Another type of sectarian violence is generally based on rumors concerning a Muslim woman forced to convert to Christianity or one who would like to convert to Islam and is prevented from doing so by his family or the Christian community. On 8 May 2011, just few months after the Egyptian revolution, a night of street fighting between Muslims and Christians left at least 12 deaths, six Christians and six Muslims, around 220 people wounded, and two churches set ablaze in the Cairo suburb of Imbala. According to the eyewitnesses, fighting opposed one group of begrudged and jobless youth against another. Rumors gravitated around the interfaith romance. A young Muslim came to fetch his former Christian wife, who had converted to Islam and had married him, but she had recently disappeared and according to him, she had been kidnapped and held in the Church of St. Mina[5]. This pattern of a convert to Islam, whose community refuses her new faith and imprisons her is recurrent in the sectarian clashes in Egypt. Christians in the neighborhood said that no such woman was in the church and the local police agreed.

Mobile phone technology is put at the service of this sectarian violence: people call each other to come to the street in defense of their community and their number swells, making the confrontation bloodier.

The resurgence of sectarian violence is in a large part due to the emergence of the fundamentalist Salafis who believe that Islamic Sharia should be applied in relation to the other faiths in Egypt. The crisis of the state and the disorganization of the security forces as well as their taking sides with the Salafis against the Copts, render the problem the more insoluble.

Feeling alienated by the Morsi government, and insecure for the defense of their churches and houses by the MB authorities, Copts turned against the latter and in the street demonstrations for toppling the government, they actively participated. After the overthrow of Morsi, the ire of the MB sympathizers turned against them. Many churches were burnt (according to

the NGO Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights), since August 14, 2013 at least 25 churches were set ablaze and many Coptic schools, houses and shops were attacked in 10 out of the 27 provinces of Egypt. The Youth Maspero Movement put the numbers much higher, 39 churches being attacked in many different towns and cities.

## Violence Between the Secular and the Islamist Actors

True or not, secular people in Egypt believed that they were the main actors of the revolutionary wave that overthrew the Mubarak regime. This perception was put into question when they lost the first parliamentary elections to the Islamists (the Muslim Brotherhood and to a lesser degree, to the Salafis) (Husain, 2012), held between November 2011 and January 2012. The Freedom and Justice Party (the political party affiliated to the MB) obtained 37,5% of the votes, the Al-Nour Party (Salafis) 27,8%, and the rest was split among numerous political parties, some belonging to the secular-revolutionary trend. The feeling of a "symbolic violence" was strong right from the moment the Muslim Brotherhood held the majority in the Parliament and was further intensified with the election of Morsi as the President of Egypt.

Since Morsi's presidency in June 2012 and his attempts, regarded as imposing a new Constitution that betrayed the revolution's ideals from the Seculars' viewpoint, violence against the Muslim Brotherhood became one of the constant features of the street protests in Egypt. In Alexandria, at the end of March 2013, demonstrations swept in protest against the government's crackdown on freedom and mistreatment of the opposition activists. In Sidi Gabi, a district in Alexandria, the clashes ended up with the two sides throwing Molotov cocktails and stones at each other. On the evening of Friday March 29, 2013, dozens of protesters skirmished with security forces at the MB headquarters in Zagazig district of Alexandria. Protesters targeted them in a march, but large number of MB sympathizers and members were stationed there to protect the building (MENA, 2013). These affairs and the way they were dealt with was regarded as the sign of Muslim Brotherhood's direct implication in the matters pertaining to the government. In most cases the police and the military refused to intervene in

order to defend the MB centers. The movement against President Morsi and the MB radicalized gradually. On Friday March 29, 2013, a small number of activists marched from Tahrir Square to the High Court late afternoon, demanding the fall of Morsi, the dissolution of the Muslim Brotherhood and Prosecutor General Talaat Abdallah's dismissal. At the High Court, altercations broke out when some protesters began chanting for army rule, saying: "The army is ours, the supreme guide is not". Other demonstrators objected to the chants.

Central Security Forces were deployed to the High Court's main lobby mid-Friday afternoon, reinforcing the already heavy security presence in place since this morning. Hundreds of demonstrators continued to flock to the area, assembling in front of the prosecutor general's office in the court complex. Dozens of protesters began gathering outside the High Court earlier on Friday afternoon in preparation for a protest they called, "We are not to be intimidated". They chanted, "We will not go, he (Morsi) shall go", "The people want to bring down the regime", "I am not a coward, I am not a (Muslim) Brother", "Morsi, leave!" and "Secular, secular, we do not want a Brotherhood [state]" (Egypt Independent, 2013).

Thus the opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood, the President Morsi and the Islamists by secular forces tended to blend in a single protest movement that threatened to mutate street violence into a general civil war.

Representatives of 12 youth groups, including the Dostour Party, Free Egyptians Party, the Kefaya Movement, the Second Revolution of Anger and Maspero Youth Union, held a meeting Tuesday, March 26, 2013, at the Youth for Freedom and Justice Movement headquarters to discuss their Friday plans. They announced that they would perform Friday prayers outside the prosecutor general's office at the High Court in Cairo (Egypt Independent, 2013). They demanded the dismissal of Prosecutor General Talaat Abdallah, Justice Minister Ahmed Mekki and Interior Minister Mohamed Ibrahim after Abdallah issued arrest warrants for five activists accused of inciting clashes near the Muslim Brotherhood headquarters in Moqattam the week before. They also called for the public prosecutor to summon Brotherhood members involved in violent incidents around Moqattam and the Ettehadiya President Palace, and accused the judiciary of bias and unfairness.

Radicalization of the secular and leftist political parties demanding an end to the President's rule and their direct confrontation with the security forces in the name of the revolutionary ideals frequently ended up in physical violence. Disrespect for the "rules" became an almost permanent feature of the demonstrations, security forces acting more or less arbitrarily towards them, between the sheer absence of police forces to the disproportionate repression of the protesters.

The deep frustration of the secular forces pushed them towards activism, first street activism, then alliance with the military to overthrow Morsi. Tamarrod movement became symbolically very important against Morsi, a high number of signatures (claimed without any tangible proof to be around 22 millions, a number by far superior to the 13 million people who voted for Morsi) being gathered that asked for his resignation.

The number of the people taking part in the street movement on June 29 was highly overblown, mythical numbers of people being supposed to have taken part in the street protest[6]. Disinformation and widespread distortion of reality found a large echo in the international media who uncritically reproduced the excessively inflated number of protesters, unwillingly legitimizing the military coup that toppled the government. Violence and hundreds of deaths were the outcome of the coup, with an enduring political crisis.

**Violence and the Security Forces**

Police stations, under Mubarak, were the local representatives of power, mostly inspiring fear. After the revolution, the police was targeted as one of the main culprits, having allegedly tortured or caused the death of many citizens during the 18 days demonstrations that overthrew the Mubarak regime. Citizens awaited the trial of the culprits among the security. Disappointment overcame many activists who did not see any major prosecution against the police forces, nor any change of their harsh style of repression.

Since the election of Morsi in June 2012, a new type of tension between the MB and the police on the one side, the opposing activists on the other took place. On March the 3rd, in Port Said, three policemen were killed in the

street protests. Violent clashes opposed demonstrators and policemen at the Tahrir Square. The same phenomenon took place in Suez, Kafr al-Sheikh, and Qalyubia. In these demonstrations President Morsi was perceived as the Trojan Horse of the MB, instrumental in assuring its hegemony on the government (Al-Tahrir, 2013).

After the military coup in July 2013, many thousands of MB members or sympathizers were arrested (around 8000 according to some estimates), and around 1000 demonstrators against the coup d'Etat were arrested, the "worst Mass Unlawful Killings in Country's Modern History" happening on August 14, 2013 killings, the death toll amounting to 638 people, of which 595 civilians and 43 police officers, with at least 3,994 injured, according to the Egyptian Health Ministry (Human Rights Watch, 2013). However, the Muslim brotherhood and National Coalition for Supporting Legitimacy (NCSL) put the number of deaths from the Cairo's Rabaa al-Adawiya Mosque sit-in alone at some 2,600.

**Symbolic Violence**

Many types of violence intermingled in Egypt after the revolution, one of them involving irony and desecration of the Power-that-be, in the very person of the President Morsi. In a situation of relative calm where institutions would work properly, this type of violence might reinforce civil society and remind power holders of their conditional legitimacy in the eyes of the public. But in a situation where street violence had become almost endemic, symbolic violence through irony and sarcasm became a tool reinforcing the crisis of legitimacy. One prominent case was the popular TV satirist Bassem Youssef. On March 30, 2013 he was accused by the public prosecutor of insulting the President Morsi and denigrating Islam. Filing suit was regarded by the opposition as a sign of authoritarianism by the government, acting according to the old autocratic style. A week earlier, the public prosecutor ordered the arrest of five activists, charging them for the use of social media in order to incite violence against the MB. This attitude raised the scepter of press censorship in the eyes of many revolutionary actors (Fahim & El Sheik, 2013).

Majority political figures became the target of the attacks, Morsi but also some of his ministers and more generally, the MB hierarchy. Symbolic and physical violence were combined in order to dethrone the President and the MB as an organization.

In an incident regarding Morsi, activists spread clover plants across the presidential yard, a symbolic suggestion that he was an animal that needed common livestock feed. Mourad Ali, the Freedom and Justice Party's media advisor, the political party created by the MB, posted a statement on the FJP Facebook page: "What they did by raising underwear in front of the interior minister's house is [a sign of] moral collapse that is even worse than what they did last week, attempting to insult the President by scattering Egyptian clover in front of his house" (Al-Youm, 2013).

Security forces arrested four members of the April 6 Youth Movement on Friday March 29th, 2013, during a protest staged in front of Interior Minister Mohamed Ibrahim's home in Nasr City. According to the security officials, dozens of protesters illegally penetrated into the minister's house at midnight, some with Molotov cocktails. Early in the morning, the protesters raised underwear and vilified him as a "slut". A source from the Cairo security department said the troops fired tear gas to disperse the protesters, but April 6 accused security of firing bird shot as well, injuring some of their members.

In the eyes of the opposition, the figureheads of the President and his major ministers as well as the leadership of the MB had been irreparably destroyed at the symbolic level, before being demised by the military coup.

**Violence against Civil Society Organizations**

This type of violence consists in attacking, repressing or simply closing down civil society organizations. Before the election of the first new President, the military ruled Egypt, between February 2011 and June 2012. During that period, human rights and pro-democracy organizations were targeted. Some of them were funded by American donors and were closed down (like National Democratic Institute and the International Republican Institute, both affiliated with the two major US political parties, the Freedom House), others by German ones (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung). They were

officially suspected of spreading unrest in the country. 17 civil society organizations were thus scapegoated by the military, to vindicate their repression against the "foreign" institutions that spread unrest into the country (Beaumont & Harris, 2011).

## Jihadist Violence

With the toppling of Morsi government, Egypt witnessed the significant return of jihadist violence, first and foremost in the Sinai desert areas, and then in major cities. After the demise of Morsi by the army on July the 3rd 2013, the repression against the MB began swiftly, ending up in August 14, 2013 with the killing of more than 1000 people at the Rabaa al-Adawiya Mosque (official estimates, 638 people killed, according to the MB, more than 2600). Gradually, part of the MB youth, angered by the lack of action by the organization's officials separated and joined violent groups, mainly Jihadist ones.

Besides that, the Arab Revolutions released from jail or received from exile thousands of Jihadists and in Egypt alone, around 1200 militants could join Islamist militant groups (Dettmer, 2013). The latter, mainly al-Furqan Brigades, Ansar Beit al-Maqdis and the Jamal Network were reinforced, first through the conciliatory attitude of the Morsi government that tried to persuade their members to join peaceful movements and then, after Morsi's removal, found a new legitimacy among part of the revolutionary youth who revolted against the military coup against the democratically elected Morsi government. According to the major Jihadist ideologue Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, the Egyptian army's coup demonstrated "the soundness of the Jihadi project and the choice of the ammunition box over the ballot box" (Dettmer, 2013).

In December 2013, prior to the third anniversary of the Egyptian Revolution (January 25), many attacks occurred, in Mansoura (Nile's Delta) on December 24, killing 15 people. On December 26, a bomb exploded in Cairo, killing 5 people. On December 29, an attack against a military building in the province of Charkiya, in the Nile Delta, wounded at least four soldiers. They were claimed by the jihadist group Ansar Beit al-Makdis, a jihadist organization that began its operations in the Sinai desert with the

insurgency there on February 2011, just after the Egyptian Revolution. It bombed many pipelines carrying gas from Egypt to Israel, claimed responsibility for an attack on a military intelligence building in Ismailia in October 2013, as well as the 24 January 2014 Cairo bombings.

Jihadist violence, in particular in Sinai, has become frequent and the military's repression of Morsi's legal government gives them a surplus of legitimacy.

The army's repression has not been able to curb it significantly and the worsening economic situation of the tribal groups and the proximity of Israel making any peaceful solution improbable. A crescendo in violence is in perspective.

## Violence against the Students

Since the Egyptian revolution, students have become one of the major social activists. During the Mubarak era, students played a significant role in opposing the autocratic rule, many of the members of the April 6 Movement belonging to them. Still, in the Egyptian Revolution of 2011, students became involved as individuals, not as a major social group. Since the school year of 2013, universities became the locus of protest movements against or for Morsi. In the 2013 Egypt's Student Union elections, independent students won against the MB candidates and Mohamed Badran became its president. He has shown support for the new draft of the constitution backed by the military, alienating many students, opposed to the military coup.

After Morsi's overthrow in July 2013 students have become social activists as such, in particular within universities, within many new associations. The Students against the Coup (SAC) was formed after the so-called "3 July Coup" and is dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood students and their sympathizers, calling themselves Rabaaweya in reference to the mosque where more than 1000 people were killed in a sit-in by the security forces on August 14, 2013. Ain Shams university is one of the major theaters of their action. The boycott of exams on December 28, 2013 was another major action promoted by SAC. Still, in many universities the examination process went on normally. Another group of student activists, mainly secular

and leftist in their political leanings was constituted composed of the 6 April Youth, the Revolutionary Socialists, Misr al-Qawia Students and the Manifesto Group. They have been acting as a student branch of the Revolutionary Front created in September 2013, critical towards the MB as well as the military (AbdAllah, 2014). El-Midan Student Group belongs to the al-Dostour Party but it marked its autonomy from the political office back in 2012 when the students criticized many figures participating in the National Salvation Front of which al-Dostour party is a member, and then, when the party supported the police and the military in July 2013 to combat "terrorism".

Violence against the students by the military has been going on crescendo since the military coup, within and without the universities.

One of the major universities to protest against the military coup of 2013 has been al Azhar whose president Mohamed al-Tayeb officially sided with general Sissi after the demise of Morsi. The demonstrations reached their peak during the midyear examinations when Students against the Coup (SAC), mostly sympathizers of the Muslim Brotherhood, announced their boycott of the exams.

The Engineering Student Union at University of Zagazig, the capital of at Ash Sharqiyah governorate, engaged in a strike on November 16, 2013, asking for the release of the detained students and the resignation of the Dean, among other claims. On the same day Security forces stormed into the university after the authorization by its President, detaining number of students believed to be MB sympathizers. The attacks triggered protests at other faculties in the university. Other universities joined the strike, among them Ain Shams faculties of Engineering, Medicine, Helwan Faculties of Engineering… Students belonging to the MB demonstrated in different universities, commemorating 100 days after the "Rabaa massacre" of August 14 in al Azhar, Cairo, Zagarig, Helwan and Beni Suef.

In January 2014, before the third anniversary of the Revolution, many protest movements by students were crushed by the security forces. In Assiut University, on Sunday January 5, 2014 demonstrators were met with birdshots by the security forces, leading to more than 50 students injured. Police stormed into university campuses.

All in all, during the Morsi Presidency and the interim government after the military coup, students became one of the major activists against the Powers that be. Violence towards them within and without the university became one of the salient features of the new regime, after the coup.


## Conclusion

One major mottos of the Egyptian revolution was peacefulness or lack of violence (*Selmiyah*). After the revolution, the combination of the Islamists' winning the elections, and the inability of the new political actors to reach a compromise resulted in mutual distrust and demonization, culminating in a military coup.

There was a growing sense of impatience towards the political stalemate, and Morsi's inept and sometimes arrogant style of government pushed the opposition towards radicalization. A new attitude among many opposition groups became prevalent, regarding violence as legitimate against the government. Part of the revolutionary youth engaged in street violence that became endemic in some cities. Violence became even bloodier with the Military coup, the prospect of a peaceful transition to democracy becoming dim after the overthrow of the first democratically elected President, Morsi.

The military coup opened up a new era of ordeal for the MB. This political organization, one of the oldest in modern Egypt and one of the most influential in the Muslim world, had been, for more than half a century, a political body used to clandestinity and repression. At best, the organization was partly tolerated (as around 2005's parliamentary elections), by Mubarak. But its public activities were short-lived since its inception in 1928 and the old organization returned invariably to its semi-clandestine, semi-public status after short periods of open activity (in the 2010 parliamentary elections the Muslim Brotherhood was denied the facilities of 2005). The Egyptian Revolution of 2011 gave the MB the opportunity to become a public organization with a central political role. But the semi-clandestine apparatus did not easily mutate into a political organization and the old reflexes and suspicions remained among its members, except for a thin layer of the youth among them, the latter being marginalized by the old MB members within a gerontocratic hierarchy. The MB remained, up to the very

end, a Janus bifrons: it oscillated between the old attitudes of opacity and secrecy represented by parts of its members and the new necessities for openness and communication in an era of turbulence and revolutionary impatience. The identity crisis was the deeper as the MB took the helms of power almost by "enchantment". It sent its members to the parliament and became the largest political party in Egypt (more than 40% of the members of the new parliament belonged to it), then its candidate for Presidency was elected (with the fourth of the votes, due to the split among the opposition groups), all of this without the MB's being prepared to take the reins of the government by having a clear vision of the future for Egypt. More precisely, the MB took power without having any political program, strategic vision or economic platform to address the major challenges facing the post revolutionary Egypt (Hassan, n.d.). At the same time, most of Egypt's Deep State (Levinson & Bradley, 2014) (at the top of which, the interior ministry, the largest part of the security forces, the ministry of justice's organizations headed by the judges, more generally, large parts of the state bureaucracy) refused to cooperate with the MB and went on an implicit strike during the entire period of Morsi's presidency.

Comparing the Egyptian Revolution of 2011 to the Islamic Revolution of Iran in 1979, one has to recognize that more than three decades after the debacle of the secular classes in Iran, in Egypt secular classes have become more self-conscious than before. When ayatollah Khomeyni took the reins of power, he found a disunited and a divided secular middle class, whose members were deeply suspicious to each others in ideological terms: leftist revolutionaries versus non-political technocratic middle classes. The leftist ideology minored the role of the Islamists who were supposed to be the members of the traditional "petty bourgeoisie" with whom the revolutionaries should cooperate more willingly than with the class enemies of the "liberal bourgeoisie" who were "counter-revolutionaries". Ideologically blinded leftist secular middle classes were more sympathetic to the Islamists' views of religion and daily life than to their fellow members of the middle classes whom they accused of an imaginary subservience to the "imperialist international bourgeoisie", this blindness continued with the Iranian Tudeh (the Communist Party) cooperating with the Khomeynist regime until they were liquidated by it. The "Islamist" dimension of the

revolution was thus minored and treated as an insignificant "superstructure" against the "infrastructure" of the economic relations that should determine "in the last resort" the political and social allegiances (the Khomeynist "petty bourgeois" regime was supposed to be more inclined towards working class people than the mythical Iranian "grand bourgeoisie" that would side with the imperialist West). With the Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions, after two years of Islamist rule (by far less stringent in religious terms than the Iranian Theocracy), the secular classes refused submission to Islamist norms restricting one's daily life in the name of the Sharia. Although the opposition Secular/Islamist does not give a comprehensive picture of the military coup in Egypt in July 2013 and the public attitude of the secular middle classes in Tunisia, still, this dimension remains one of the major axes around which opposing actors evolved before and after the military coup in Egypt and during the period extending from the murder of the two secular leaders in Tunisia (Shukri Belaid's killing on February 6, 2013 and Mohamad Brahmi, on July 25, 2013) until the resignation of the Ennahda Prime minister and the adoption of the new secular constitution on January 26, 2014. Secular, middle class or "would-be" middle class actors henceforth refuse to play the role assigned to them by the radical Islamists who view "revolution" as the restoration of coercive religious values, in particular towards women's modesty and their "decency", whereas the new generations view their personal freedom as paramount and reject being imposed those religious norms that would jeopardize it. This tension structured the large protest movements against Morsi in Egypt and in a less radical way, against the Ennahda Party in Tunisia during the entire year of 2013.

By overthrowing Morsi, the Egyptian army and the opposition epitomized violence as the major means of achieving their political goals. The use and abuse of the words "terrorists", "terrorism" and the like, to characterize the MB by the media supportive of the army and the opponents to Morsi is reminiscent of the intolerant language of authoritarianism that was fought by the revolutionaries at the outset of the January 25 Revolution. The lesson might not be forgotten in the future crises, the "political memory" privileging the use of violence to the detriment of the legal and institutional means every time discontent simmers against the political leadership.

In summary, at the beginning of the Arab revolutions, almost everywhere dignity of the citizen (*karamah*) and non-violence (*selmiyah*) were the two inseparable notions singling out these uprisings from the Nationalist and Islamist ones in the past[7]. The evolution of the movements challenged the fragile dignity of the citizen, violence emerging as the only appropriate response to the government repression and ineptitude, be it in Yemen, Syria or Libya. With the exception of Tunisia where a sense of compromise prevailed and the Islamist government subscribed to a consensual new Constitution (in part for fear of suffering the same fate as the MB in Egypt), almost everywhere two factors combined to debilitate the new movement for the dignity of the citizens: the authoritarian state and geopolitics. In Egypt, the Morsi government was insensitive to consensus. Youth's revolutionary impatience was also detrimental to the preservation of dignity since it promoted violent street action that in turn put into question toleration and politics according to the supremacy of the law. Dignity divorced from non-violence, exerting a disruptive impact on social dialogue. In Egypt, the military coup opened a chasm between dignity and peacefulness, each side begrudging the other's violence. The "dignity revolutions" found in Egypt a tragic ending, the major notions around which they evolved being sharply questioned by the street violence and the Coup d'Etat.

The military coup has been alternately interpreted in two divergent manners. For the first version, it was not a coup from above but what a popular movement aspired to, the military being only the performers of a composition written down and played by the people. According to this understanding, the "Neo-Seculars" salvaged the Egyptian society from the lasting domination of the MB who intended to impose Islamist rule on the people. Within this framework, the coup was a political-military action of the Egyptian society against the inept and hegemonic MB.

The second reading regards the military coup as an illegitimate act of violence against a fragile but burgeoning democracy that was suppressed by the alliance of intolerant groups who did not submit to the majority rule.

Both of these views can lay claim to a partial truth. But the democratization process has largely suffered from the military intervention, many groups preferring the authoritarianism of the army to the unruly

democratization process that was open-ended and created chaos and uncertainty.

The rising expectations of the lower classes after the 2011 revolution as well as the fear of the secular classes towards the MB as an Islamist party inclined to "brotherize" (*ikhwanah*) (that is, to put under the aegis of the Muslim Brotherhood) the state apparatus blended into a protest movement manipulated by the powerful military establishment, resulting in the overthrow of Morsi and the return to power of the military. Since then, three major events have taken place:

- the protest movement by the MB's supporters continued unabated up to February 2014, more and more vigorously repressed by the military, ending up with numerous deaths (more than thousand) and arrests. With the military's aim at imposing its rule on the street (prohibition of demonstrations without the authorities' leave), part of the secular revolutionaries who were opposed to the Muslim Brotherhood, joined the new loose opposition to the new State (among others, the April 6 Movement…). In December 2013 the Egyptian government declared MB a terrorist organization and seized the remainder of its assets, all its activities becoming illegal.

- a tiny part of the MB's youth joined the jihadists and became involved in the violent action against the military and the police. In Sinai almost on a daily basis and in the large cities more or less sporadically, a nucleus of a new jihadist group took shape that fights through violent means against the military rule.

- the large majority of the revolutionaries, especially the youth, is in a state of despair and apathy, the ideals of the 2011 Revolution being more and more put into question by the new regime, the majority claiming more security and stability even at the detriment of freedom, due to the desperate economic situation of the lower classes. The Constitution, approved by the overwhelming majority of those who went to the polls (more than 98%) with a turnout of 38,6% of the voters gave a large clout to the army. Those who demonstrated against the vote were harshly repressed, especially in the third anniversary of the revolution (49 people died, 1079 were arrested (Kingsley, 2014) and the day before the January 25th, explosions killed 10 people and injured around 80 close to the Cairo security directorate building, the attacks

being claimed by a Jihadist group, Ansar Beit al-Maqdis). Prominent figures of the 2011 Revolution are in prison (Ahmed Maher, Mohamed Adel, Ahmed Douma, Alaa Abdel Fattah) and prominent members of the Mubarak regime coming back to the political stage (the so-called *fulul*).

The need for security and stability is valued by the silent majority over the turmoil that was prevalent for three years since the revolution, during which no perspective of compromise between the power holders and the radicalized activists loomed on the horizon. The military rule opened up a new era, xenophobia and suspicion towards any dissent finding their justification in an attitude of passive acceptance of the military rule by the voters, the army being regarded as the only dependable institution within a society in deep crisis.

# Notes

[1] The official fact-finding mission investigating the death toll of Egypt's revolution announced that at least 846 were killed and 6,467 injured. See www.egypttoday.com/news/display/article/artId:269/coping-with-the-revolution/secId:6

[2] The claims by the revolutionaries in Egypt as well as in Tunisia had no direct bearing to religion. In Tunisia, the young Bouazizi who committed suicide did it without any regard to religion (generally speaking, Islam condemns suicide and his act had no direct bearing to martyrdom). On the Tahrir Square in Cairo, none of the slogans had direct religious justification or claim to it. The revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia were "postislamist" in the sense that social demands supposed, in their formulation, a social realm distinct from the religious one, this division of the spheres being not regarded as anti-Islamic by the protagonists. What was at the center of the claims was the end of autocracy, corruption and exclusion of the people from the political arena. The "secular" side of these two paradigmatic revolutions point to this fact. This view is however different from the secular ones in the West in that it leaves in limbo all those aspects of "democracy" that can become conflictive with Islam, like the citizenship issue (should non-Muslims have the same political rights as Muslims?), the question of the "apostasy" (*ridda*), of banking (the notion of riba', usury)… Those who set off the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt "ignored" these questions, they were not frontally anti-religious, nor atheists, but "secularized believers" for most of them (besides part of the Diaspora that had adopted Western secular views).

[3] The word "secular" with its Western connotations is difficult to use without caveats. By secular Muslims (or Secular) I mean those who were distinct in their worldviews from the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafis, who did not believe that major reforms should adopt a mould according to the Sharia' and who were mostly "non-practicing" Muslims, without denying to Islam its moral and social legitimacy. They were "secularized" in an ambiguous manner, not against Islam, but by loosening their ties to the religious prescriptions. Only a tiny minority were "secular" in the Western sense, mostly among the upper middle classes or the Diaspora. Still, religion was not at the forefront of their claims, social justice and

political opening being their major concern. See for the ambivalence of this type of secularization in the new generations in Iran.

[4] Glen Johnson and Luke Harding profiles at The Guardian:
www.guardian.co.uk/profile/glen-Johnson, www.guardian.co.uk/profile/lukeharding. Retrieved on Tuesday 20th December 2011.

[5] David D. Kirkpatrick 8/5/ 2011 New York Times
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/k/david-d-kirkpatrick/index.html?inline=nyt-per

[6] Anti-Morsi authorities estimated the number of the street demonstrators against him on June 30, 2013 ranging from 14,3 to 33 millions. According to the calculations made by taking into account the surface of the places where demonstrations took place, the maximum number of the people around Tahrir Square and the adjacent streets would be less than 700.000. The reference by the sympathizers of the military to Google Earth was unsubstantiated and the total number of the people in the streets in the major cities would be by far less than 2 millions (MEMO, 2013).

[7] See for a discussion about these three types of social movements in the history of the Muslim world (Khosrokhavar, 2012).

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**Farhad Khosrokhavar** is professor at Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, member of the Centre d'Analyse et d'Intervention Sociologique.

**Contact Address:** UMR 8039 CNRS-EHESS, 190-198, Avenue de France -75244- Paris Cedex 13. Phone: +33 01 49 54 25 63. Email: cavard@ehess.fr

# Integrating the Best of Both Worlds: Details from Mexican-Origin College Students about Their Bicultural Identities and Adjustment Experiences

Kyle Anne Nelson[1] & Michel Infante[2]

1) University of Northern Colorado. United States
2) Family and Intercultural Resource Center. United States

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# Integrating the Best of Both Worlds: Details from Mexican-Origin College Students about Their Bicultural Identities and Adjustment Experiences

Kyle Anne Nelson
*University of Northern Colorado*

Michel Infante
*Family and Intercultural Resource Center*

**Abstract**

What influences the successful bicultural adjustment of ethnic minority adolescents into the mainstream American culture? While previous research has indicated that the most successful adjustment process involves the forging of new identities combining characteristics from both the culture of origin and the new culture, there is little exploration into the details of this process from the perspective of minorities who have successfully achieved bicultural adjustment. In order to determine whether bicultural adjustment is an evident as well as a consciously valued process among minority adolescents, we conducted in-depth written surveys with open-ended questions of 20 Mexican-origin college students. By focusing on high-achievers as measured by college attendance, we aim to highlight key elements of the cultural adjustment process that lead to positive outcomes for ethnic minority adolescents. The survey results provide rich evidence in the participants' own words about the complex nature and value of bicultural adjustment. These findings can inform adjustment efforts of ethnic minority adolescents as well as the institutions and community organizations who serve them.

**Keywords:** bicultural adjustment, immigrant integration, acculturation

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# Integrando lo mejor de ambos mundos: Detalles de las identidades biculturales y experenicas de ajustamiento de estudiantes universitarios de origen mexicano

Kyle Anne Nelson
*University of Northern Colorado*

Michel Infante
*Family and Intercultural Resource Center*

## Resumen

¿Que influye en el éxito de ajustamiento cultural de adolescentes de minoría étnica hacia la cultura dominante Norteamericana? Mientras investigaciones anteriores sugieren que el proceso más exitoso es el ajustamiento bicultural por lo cual minorías étnicas esencialmente forjan nuevas identidades combinando características de la cultura de origen y la nueva cultura, hay poca exploración de los detalles de este proceso en perspectiva de aquellos que han realizado el ajustamiento bicultural. Para determinar si el ajustamiento bicultural es evidente y conscientemente valorado en adolescentes de minoría étnica, nosotros llevamos a cabo 20 encuestas profundas de estudiantes universitarios de origen mexicano. Enfocándonos en estudiantes destacados, medido por su asistencia universitaria, nosotros aspiramos resaltar elementos claves en el proceso de ajustamiento cultural que guían resultados positivos para adolescentes de minoría étnica. Los resultados de las encuestas proveen fuerte evidencia en las palabras propias de los participantes sobre la naturaleza compleja y el valor del ajustamiento bicultural. Estos descubrimientos pueden informar esfuerzos de integración de adolescentes de minoría étnica al igual que a las instituciones y organizaciones comunitarias que los atienden.

**Palabras clave:** ajustamiento bicultural, integración de inmigrantes, aculturación

## Introduction

**W**hat influences the successful bicultural adjustment of ethnic minority adolescents into the mainstream American culture? While previous research has indicated that the most successful adjustment process involves the forging of new identities combining characteristics from both the culture of origin and the new culture (Organista, Marín, & Chun, 2010; Yang, Byers, Salazar, & Salas, 2009), there is little consensus on the details of this process drawing from the perspective of minorities who have successfully achieved bicultural adjustment (Alegria, 2009; Cabassa, 2003). In order to determine whether bicultural adjustment is an evident as well as a consciously valued process among minority adolescents, we conducted in-depth written surveys with open-ended questions of 20 Mexican-origin college students. The survey results provide rich evidence in the participants' own words about the nature and value of bicultural adjustment. Through detailed discussion of ethnicity, cultural identity, language, aspects of American and Mexican cultures, and advice for future newcomers to the U.S., the participants each report having experienced aspects of and/or having a preference for bicultural adjustment. These findings can inform adjustment efforts of ethnic minority adolescents as well as the institutions and community organizations who serve them.

Latinos comprise the fastest growing ethnic minority group in the United States (Ennis, Rios-Vargas, & Albert, 2011). Mexicans are the largest group of origin among U.S. Latinos, comprising nearly 65% (Motel & Patten, 2010). Approximately 16% of all children enrolled in primary education are of Mexican origin and this proportion is expected to almost double by 2050 (Fry & Gonzales, 2008). While the proportion of Mexican-origin individuals obtaining a college degree or higher by age 25 has increased steadily since 1970, only 10.9% had achieved this level of education in 2010 compared to 13.9% for all Hispanics and 29.9% of the total population (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012).

Given that more Mexican-origin adolescents are attending American academic institutions than ever before, the analysis of the bicultural adjustment process is critical to efforts to support and promote higher

education among Mexican students and other ethnic and racial minorities (Bacallao & Smokowski, 2009; Organista, Marín, & Chun, 2010; Yang et al., 2009;). Large-scale quantitative studies of the bicultural adjustment process among Mexican-origin, Latino, and immigrant college students have yielded important findings about the measurement and dimensions of bicultural adjustment (Birman, 1998; Iturbide, Raffaelli, & Carlo, 2009; Schwartz, Kim, Whitbourne, Zamboanga, Weisskirch, Forthun, Vazsonyi, Beyers, & Luyckx, 2013; Schwartz, Waterman, Umaña-Taylor, Lee, Kim, Vazsonyi, & Williams, 2012; Yang et al., 2009). Viruell-Fuentes (2007) analyzed qualitative data from 40 in-depth interviews with female Mexican immigrants which contributed to a better understanding of group-level forces in the acculturation process. Drawing from the example of Viruell-Fuentes (2007), this study aims to enhance the understanding of bicultural adjustment of Mexican-origin college students by focusing on their own accounts and perceptions of the process. As noted by Cabassa (2003, p. 143), "Research in this area needs to move forward by combining different methods (qualitative and quantitative techniques) to create a better knowledge base for understanding what influences this process". As Alegria (2009, p. 998) states, "More importance needs to be given to how acculturation happens in different contexts… and the interactions that lead to successful and healthy integration in U.S. society". The goal of this study is to explore the cultural adjustment of high-achieving Mexican-origin adolescents in their own words.

In addition, many studies examining the bicultural experiences of Mexican adolescents in the U.S. focus on addressing the needs of students and communities with low educational outcomes (Espinoza, Gillen-O'Neel, Gonzales, & Fuligni, 2013; Landale, McHale, & Booth, 2009). Conversely, this study seeks to learn from the experiences and insights of high achieving Mexican adolescents as measured by their enrollment in higher education. As such, this study aims to highlight key elements of the cultural adjustment process that lead to positive outcomes for ethnic minority adolescents.

## Bicultural Adjustment

Migration theories have outlined numerous typologies of cultural adjustment (Lafromboise, Coleman, & Gerton, 1993; Lopez-Class, Castro, & Ramirez, 2011; Schwartz, Unger, Zamboanga, & Szapocznik, 2010). Ethnic minorities commonly experience mental and emotional distress due to the push-and-pull tensions between original and mainstream cultures (Bacallao & Smokowski, 2009; Greenman & Xie, 2008; Smokowski & Bacallao, 2011). Cultural adjustment experiences can be negative either due to discrimination, rejection of the new culture, or inadvertent loss of one's original culture (Bacallao & Smokowski, 2009; Dettlaff, Earner, & Phillips, 2009).

Bicultural adjustment has been theorized to minimize the strain of adjustment while maximizing the potential for success in mainstream American society (Lafromboise, Coleman, & Gerton, 1993; Organista, Marín, & Chun, 2010). To best understand the facets of biculturalism, it is useful to compare it to two other theories of adjustment: acculturation and assimilation. Each of these processes is characterized by incorporation of ethnic minorities in American society; nevertheless, they represent important differences across the range of possibilities for cultural adjustment. *Acculturation* focuses on adaptation of the individual in a new society as a separate reality from one's culture of origin; *Assimilation* incorporates the individual in American society by in essence eliminating the culture of origin; *Biculturalism* is a process by which an individual successfully integrates both new and old cultures in a dynamic enrichment or enhancement of identity. Below, these processes are discussed in turn.

*Acculturation* is the process through which members of a minority group interact with members of the dominant culture and adopt new practices while either breaking away from their culture of origin entirely or keeping that part of their identity separate and apart from the new culture (Bacallao & Smokowski, 2009; Organista et al., 2010;). One either loses the culture of origin or lives in two separate worlds. While individuals who acculturate may manage to preserve their original cultural identities as distinct from their practices within the new culture (i.e., language, customs, and traditions), they would be aware of constantly having to shift from one identity to the other.

*Assimilation* is defined as the process by which minority group members more fully adopt the new mainstream culture as they integrate socially and economically (Alba & Nee, 2005). While contemporary assimilation theory posits that the mainstream culture is also changed by the presence of newcomers, one who assimilates essentially loses much of the culture of origin, and replaces it with the dominant group's culture. This process virtually requires elimination of an individual's original cultural identity in order for he or she to "make it" in the new mainstream society. While assimilation can have advantages for social and economic success in a new culture over the long term, individuals can have difficulties making the transition and suffering the loss of their original culture. This loss of culture is non-reversible as the individual becomes a full-fledged member of the host culture (Bacallao & Smokowski, 2009; Djajic, 2003; Yang et al., 2009).

Research findings show that acculturation and assimilation can produce negative health behaviors and mental health problems among adolescent minorities (Bacallao & Smokowski, 2009; Organista et al., 2010). When immigrants replace their culture by assimilating, they lose the ability to explore opportunities and utilize resources from their culture of origin. Meanwhile the break from the culture of origin and shift to the new culture can be extremely disruptive and difficult. Bacallao and Smokowski (2009) explained that adolescents go through an "ethnic fight" when the dominant culture dethrones the culture of origin, and results in negative social and emotional consequences such as stress or depression.

*Biculturalism* –also known as *Integration*- suggests that a newcomer may incorporate the dominant culture within his or her original cultural identity (Bacallao & Smokowski, 2009; Organista et al., 2010). Bicultural individuals have the ability to effectively merge their two identities; they can draw on various characteristics within their identity from either the culture of origin or the new culture depending on the situation. Additionally, an individual may not be aware of any shift in identities as can take place in the acculturation process, but rather may see his/her integrated identity as natural, having created a new cultural identity comprised of fundamental elements from each culture. Distinct from acculturation and assimilation, biculturalism emphasizes maintenance and integration of both original and new cultures. Further, biculturalism is parallel to the concept of

transnationalism; in other words, immigrants who adapt to the U.S. society via this model maintain multiple relations with members from the ethnic community and dominant society (Sanchez & Machado Casas, 2009).

According to Bacallao and Smokowski (2009), some Mexican adolescents overcome linguistic and social challenges by creating friendships with American adolescents and by learning to speak English. If relationships with Americans are established, they can be very instrumental to language acquisition and the overall cultural adjustment process. Those American adolescents who established friendships with immigrants were found to show interest in learning the Mexican culture, therefore easing the adjustment process for some Mexican-origin adolescents (Bacallao & Smokowski, 2009). Similarly, Dettlaff, Earner and Phillips (2009) confirmed in their study of Mexican-origin adolescents that individuals who lack interactions with the host culture face more challenges adapting to the new culture than those who are able to establish friendships and contacts.

As noted above, research suggests that the best approach to adjustment in American society in terms of physical and mental well-being is by creating a dual or bicultural identity (Bacallao & Smokowski, 2009; Organista et al., 2010; Smokowski & Bacallao, 2011). Evidence shows that bicultural immigrant children, when compared to those who are fully assimilated, show lower levels of stress and depression. Moreover, studies have shown that adolescents with bicultural identities show more school interest and achieve more educational goals given their greater level of confidence in their cultural adjustment (Bacallao & Smokowski, 2009; Smokowski & Bacallao, 2011). Investigating the adjustment methods of Mexican-origin college students can inform researchers about the factors and experiences that these academically successful individuals valued in their path towards adjustment in the mainstream U.S. culture. By examining college students we can better comprehend what factors influence their social and academic accomplishments, which may serve to inform the adjustment of other minority adolescents.

## Methods

We conducted an in-depth written survey among Mexican-origin college students at a university in the West (unidentified here in order to maintain confidentiality of survey participants). In this study, participants are individuals of Mexican descent born in Mexico or in the United States who received at least part of their primary education in the United States (and thus experienced at least part of the adjustment process as an adolescent). In addition, in order to focus on the characteristics and experiences reflective of successful cultural adjustment, the sample was limited to college students. Survey participants were recruited through a university campus cultural center serving Latino students at the university.

The analysis involves a type of mixed-method approach. As explained by Creswell and Clark (2007, p. 6), "mixed method research involves both collecting and analyzing quantitative and qualitative data". Included in the survey are qualitative open-ended questions complemented by more quantitative type questions including demographic information and Likert-scale items. While the sample is not large enough to conduct statistical analysis, the value of the mixed method approach for this survey lies in the collection of both participants' own accounts and perspectives on their cultural adjustment as well as answers to more fixed questions which inform the characterization of respondents' adjustment process.

Surveys were collected during a two-month time period in 2010. The survey instrument measured the nature of cultural adjustment of the respondents as well as their perspectives on and experiences with bicultural adjustment. The cross-sectional survey instrument (available upon request) consists of 27 questions written by the researchers. Participants completed the survey privately in writing; the survey was estimated to take 45 to 60 minutes to complete. The first set of questions asked demographic information about the respondents (i.e., name, place of birth). Further questions asked participants about their personal adjustment experiences in the U.S. (e.g., When you first attended school, do you remember having problems adjusting from your culture and norms of your home environment to the classroom environment?). Open-ended items on the questionnaire allowed for free expression of respondents. For example, participants were

encouraged to explain their answers to several questions; in addition, some other questions asked participants to generate and rank their own list of answers.

**Participant Characteristics**

Twenty Mexican-origin college students participated in the study. Table 1, below, provides background information about the survey respondents.

Table 1.
*Summary of Participant Characteristics (n=20)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Average age (years)** | 21.1 |
| **Gender** | |
| Female | 10 |
| Male | 10 |
| **Year in School** | |
| Freshman | 2 |
| Sophomore | 6 |
| Junior | 3 |
| Senior | 6 |
| Graduate Student | 3 |
| **Average G.P.A.** | 2.7 |
| **Place of Birth** | |
| U.S. | 15 |
| Mexico | 5 |
| **Parents' Place of Birth** | |
| U.S. | 3 |
| Mexico | 17 |

Among the participants there were ten males and ten females. The average respondent age was 21 and there were two freshman, six sophomores, three

juniors, six seniors, and three first-year graduate students who had just graduated from college. The majority (fifteen of twenty) participants were born in the U.S. but lived in Mexico for part of their childhood. The remaining five participants came to the U.S. from Mexico at very young ages. Seventeen of twenty participants reported that their parents were both born in Mexico. Among the three participants whose parents were born in the U.S., all are bilingual in Spanish and English and one speaks only Spanish.

## Findings

Analysis of survey responses revealed that all twenty study participants—consistent with previous studies—experienced bicultural adjustment as demonstrated by their discussion of their own identities as well as responses to questions of ethnicity, language preference, language use, and advice to future newcomers to the U.S. Nearly all (nineteen of twenty) reported that biculturalism is the best way to adjust to and participate in American society. In this section, we present our data and summarize details about bicultural identity and adjustment in our participants' own words.

### Bicultural Experiences and Preferences

Table 2, below, presents a summary of the findings suggesting evidence of bicultural adjustment and preference among the survey participants. Reflective of bicultural adjustment, many of the participants preferred to speak both English and Spanish (fourteen of twenty), while four preferred Spanish and two preferred English.

Many of the participants (thirteen of twenty) reported "Mexican and American" as their ethnic identification, while the remaining seven respondents indicated their ethnicity as "Mexican".

When asked to indicate their cultural identification within a range of provided options, ten participants identified with a "Mexican and American" cultural identity, six participants culturally identified as "fairly Mexican", and the remaining four participants culturally identified as "fully Mexican".

None of the respondents self-identified as "fully American". Interestingly, there was no observable pattern across responses about language preference, ethnicity, and cultural identification in terms of being able to consistently map participants' responses across the questions.

Table 2.
*Evidence of Bicultural Adjustment (n=20)*

| Ethnic Identification | |
|---|---|
| Mexican and American | 13 |
| Mexican | 7 |
| American | 0 |
| **Cultural Identification** | |
| Fairly Mexican | 6 |
| Full Mexican | 4 |
| Mexican and American | 10 |
| Fairly American | 0 |
| Full American | 0 |
| **Preferred Language** | |
| Spanish | 4 |
| English | 2 |
| Spanish and English | 14 |
| **Shift Identities?** | |
| Yes | 7 |
| No | 9 |
| Not applicable (Fully Mexican identity) | 4 |
| **Best Way to Adjust?** | |
| Lose Mexican culture | 0 |
| Keep Mexican culture | 1 |
| Integrate both Mexican and American cultures | 19 |

As displayed above in Table 2, when asked whether or not participants shift between Mexican and American identities, nine of the sixteen participants who reported being both Mexican and American said 'no', and seven said 'yes.' Despite this apparent split in responses, examination of the written comments by respondents reveals bicultural adjustment even among those who do not feel a shift in identities takes place. Of those who said no, they do not shift, the common sentiment was that a truly new identity had emerged from the synergy of Mexican and American influences. One respondent wrote, *No, I don't think I shift, I think I created a new identity.* Similarly another wrote: *No, I am myself, I don't feel like I shift, I am a mix of both cultures.* Another stated: *No, just be myself*.

Among the respondents who said yes, a shift between Mexican and American identities does take place, the common sentiment was that having to shift is part of the bicultural adjustment reality. For example, one participant stated: *Yes, it is natural process to change identities, but it depends on the environment.* Another stated: *Yes, everyone who is multicultural does*.

Correspondingly, the participants were asked if they disagree or agree with a study that concluded that adolescents who integrate both cultures are better off than those who remained fully Mexican or became fully American. The question explained how the study found that Mexican-origin children who erase their Mexican culture or avoid the American culture showed more stress than children who are bicultural. All of the participants agreed with the study; all twenty participants explained how integrating both cultures is less stressful. Many responses mentioned that participating in both cultures gives a sense of belonging in both cultures which yields unique benefits compared to individuals who are not bicultural. A participant explained why he agrees with the study: *Yes, because integrating into both cultures will help you fit into both cultures. It is easier or less stressful when you are part of a culture because you feel like you belong.* Another wrote: *Yes, people who are bicultural are more open-minded and take on opportunities… If you are living in a place where integrated cultures exist, but are continuing to*

*isolate yourself, or close yourself off, you are not getting the best of both worlds*. Another participant explained how being bicultural is beneficial, by allowing more opportunities to succeed:

> I would classify myself as a bicultural person. There is nothing more powerful or as effective as a person who can balance cultural dynamics. Having both cultures knowledge does not limit you to either culture, it in fact opens up more opportunities to succeed.

## Preservation of Culture of Origin

Survey responses revealed the importance of preservation and often celebration of Mexican culture among participants. On a scale of "very appreciative" to "not appreciative", the vast majority of respondents (eighteen of twenty) identified as being "very appreciative" of their Mexican heritage, while one participant was "fairly appreciative" and one was "appreciative". No respondents reported being not appreciative of their Mexican culture. This is a particularly important finding given that nearly all respondents (eighteen of twenty) reported having been discriminated against because of their ethnicity and provided examples. Participants expressed pride in speaking Spanish. One of the participants explained:

> I am very proud of my first language and of who I am. And actually most of the time when people find out that Spanish is my first language they seem to like it and start questioning me about things and pronunciation in Spanish.

Another participant explained how the ability to speak Spanish is beneficial in American society:

> I feel [that speaking Spanish] is an advantage. I have dealt with situations where most people would not speak it since it would seem

discriminatory but I've made it clear that I speak both, I don't see how can [speaking Spanish] be looked down upon.

One participant shows pride in speaking Spanish and the importance of feeling comfortable with their personal cultural identity: *I am proud of my language and one of the biggest things I've learned in life is that you need to be comfortable and proud of who you are and do not let anyone make you feel inferior*.

As an indicator of closeness to one's Mexican roots, participants were asked how often they visit Mexico. A total of fifteen of the twenty participants reported visiting Mexico with some frequency: eight participants reportedly visit Mexico at least once a year, five visit once every two years, and two visit at least once every three to five years. A participant who was born in the U.S. but lived in Mexico until the age of twelve explained how she stays in contact with family in Mexico to overcome feeling homesick:

> I have a lot of family there, but we are always in contact through phone or e-mail. We usually try to go at least once a year to visit. The best way to overcome [feeling homesick] is to remember all the great things we have here [in the U.S.].

## Building Factors of the Bicultural Identity

Participants were asked to list factors that they believe comprised their bicultural Mexican and American identity. Surprisingly, many of the responses of each individual intertwine both Mexican and American identities. For example, more than half of the participants (twelve of twenty) mentioned food as a factor that constructs their Mexican identity, while ten participants mentioned food as a factor that builds their American identity. Seven of the twenty participants noted food in both lists. Music was another aspect that was present in both identity constructions of respondents. In both lists, half of the participants mentioned music as a feature that makes them

Mexican and American. In addition, another characteristic that was found to build the identities of participants was language. Eight respondents mentioned language in both the Mexican identity list and the American identity list. Among other responses that five or fewer participants mentioned in both lists were; traditions, celebrations, beliefs, culture pride, religion, sports, and television.

There were two other important factors: one found only in the Mexican identity list and the other present only in the American identity. Family was a feature that was only found to build and form participants' Mexican identity, none of the participants mentioned family as a feature that constructs their American identity. In addition, in an open-ended question that asked participants what was a major difference between the two cultures, seven of the twenty participants mentioned how the Mexican culture is more family-oriented. For instance, a respondent wrote: *Mexican culture seems to be heavily family oriented, decisions are always made with families. American culture is more individualistic.* Another participant expressed the same idea: *I think Mexican culture is a lot more family oriented, and is not looked upon as negative to have your son or daughter living with you even if they are over thirty.*

In the formation of an American identity, participants only mentioned education as a characteristic that makes them American. This factor echoes research findings that one reason many immigrants migrate to the U.S. is to give their children better life opportunities and a better education (Bacallao & Smokowski, 2009; Landale et al., 2009).

The open-ended questionnaire asked all participants to explain how they managed to adjust to school life in American society. One participant mentioned one influence that helped during the adjustment process after moving from Mexico to the U.S.:

> It was the most traumatizing experience of my life because I never expected it to be so different. The hardest thing was that I did not speak any English and that I did not have friends with me. There

was only one other kid in my grade that spoke Spanish, so I became his friend and he always helped me a lot.

A participant who was born in Mexico mentioned the advantage of having a Spanish-speaking teacher when arriving to the U.S.: *It was a little bit easier for me because my teacher spoke Spanish. Everything was so different, but my teacher made it easier for me!* Another participant who was born in Mexico explained the support that friends offer: *Friends were always a big support to me. Whether it was staying after school to help me do homework or hanging out to teach me more of their [English] language.* One U.S.-born participant explained how a bilingual school is a positive factor that helped during the adjustment process: *I struggled a little at first with not speaking too much English. What helped me adjust was going to a bilingual school where some students and some teachers spoke Spanish.*

The university attended by the survey respondents is comprised of a predominantly white student population. Mexican-origin students make up a small proportion. Latino students represent nearly ten percent of the total student population at the university where the study was conducted. Participants were asked what helped them achieve college enrollment; numerous participants felt that self-motivation was a major influence, while others mentioned family, friends and school programs. Nearly all participants (nineteen of twenty) mentioned that their family was a major influence in helping them achieve college enrollment. Similarly, Bacallao and Smokowski (2009) found that parents support the value American society places on academic success within adolescents; moreover, they clarified how friends are also a big factor to become academically successful. One student described how family and motivation helped him/her to seek and attain college enrollment: *I had a lot of motivation from my parents, knowing my family moved to better out lives, gave me the power and strength that I need to continue school. I didn't want to be another negative statistic.* Another participant discussed the role of family support: *My family has always pushed me to pursue higher goals, they made sure I*

*did not end up in a negative environment*. A third participant mentioned after-school programs as a factor that helped provide access to college:

> What has helped me achieve this goal is by taking advantage of pre-collegiate programs. Without the help of these programs I don't think I would be where I am now. Receiving the support from my family and friends also helped me achieve this goal.

In the responses of the participants, the participants described three types of positively influential friends: friends who are experiencing a similar adjustment process, friends who in the past adjusted, or welcoming American friends in the classroom. Participants built these friendships through school, sports, and after school programs. One participant discussed how friendships with Americans helped in interacting better with American society: *These friendships helped me a lot. I learned the norms of American society, as well as expectations that they (Americans) have. I learned what is acceptable and what is not, but I still stayed true to my culture*. Another participant described how interacting with American friends helped in learning about the U.S. mainstream culture: *It definitely helps, friends are the best way to learn about a culture. When you hang out with them you learn the norms and what will help you 'fit in' or be accepted*. One participant wrote about how interacting with American friends built a desire to pursue the same opportunities: *My friends' parents were so proud to be American. All the opportunities my friends had, I wanted too*.

The survey responses make it clear that participants feel that Mexican friends and Anglo friends help adjust in American society; additionally, participants explained how Mexican-origin friends give a sense of belonging or being accepted and American friends help in learning the new culture; for instance understanding the norms and traditions.

Most of the participants agreed on the importance of both Mexican-origin friends and American friends. In a question that asked if participants if having Mexican-origin friends instead of having American friends is better

to help with adjustment for a newly arrived immigrant, eighteen out of twenty participants believed that it is important to have friends on both cultural groups in order to adjust. A participant expressed the importance of both friendship, and how they helped with adjustment:

> Mexican friends will make you feel more at home and you will be able to identity with them, but the Anglo friends will be able to help you adjust to the new culture. It is easier to learn about a culture if one has friends within that culture.

A participant explained why both types of friendships are important:

> Both are highly important. From a Mexican friend you can share experiences and they can give you advice on how to deal with situations that they've been in personally. An Anglo friend can teach you so much, and educate you on different things.

Similarly, another participant explained the belief that both Mexican and American friendships helped in understanding American culture:

> I believe both are important to have. Mexican friends give you the support because they understand your culture. Anglo friends get you to understand the new life you are about to begin, they help you understand the American culture.

Establishing friendships in both cultural groups advanced the adjustment process, it gave the individual the ability to quickly learn about the new culture, but at the same time stay active in the culture of origin. As expected, participants believed that having a mix of Mexican friends and American friends was beneficial to the adjustment process. According to the responses, it is better to understand both cultures, instead of participating only in one culture.

**Advice to Facilitate Adjustment**

Participants were asked to give advice for Mexican-origin individuals who were adjusting in American society. More than half of the participants (fourteen out of twenty) listed that learning English is vital for adjustment. In addition, some participants expressed that getting involved in the community, pursuing an education, becoming a member of a club or organization, building relationships and keeping an open mind for new experiences helps individuals who go through the adjustment process. One participant advised: *[Learning] English is the most important thing to do. After that just be open to new experiences and be friendly with people.* Another stated: *I would advise to them to be successful and accommodate to this country. Learning English is a must. Also building relationships with those from the U.S. since those will be people who one will be socializing with.* A third participant discussed the importance of bicultural friendships: *Building American friendships or people who have both cultures, and they could help you learn English which will really help accommodate in American society.* Lastly, a participant advised on the importance of learning the new culture, but maintaining the culture of origin: *Learn about this new culture, but at the same time keep your own culture.*

## Discussion

This study examined detailed survey responses of the cultural adjustment and perceptions of twenty Mexican-origin college students. Findings reveal insights into the facets of adjustment that may promote social and academic success in American society. Drawing from the range of responses to the survey, bicultural adjustment was experienced by each of the participants and they expressed that integrating both cultures is a critical component of successful adjustment to life in the U.S. In addition, respondents reported that friends (both Mexican-origin and mainstream American), teachers,

parents, counselors, mentors, tutors, and educational institutions were important influences that helped facilitate their bicultural adjustment.

Though responses varied across all items of the survey, taken together the results confirm the value of bicultural adjustment. Interestingly, no patterns emerged within the sample related to differences in bicultural experiences or perceptions by country of origin, ethnic categorization, language preference, other associated characteristics or factors. The absence of these types of patterns highlights both the appropriateness of the bicultural adjustment model in terms of applicability to a range of individuals from various backgrounds, but also to the nuance of the process that cannot be easily measured by one or two individual variables or indices. Echoing Cabassa (2003) and Alegria (2009), qualitative data is an important complement to larger quantitative studies exploring bicultural adjustment.

The in-depth survey approach gave participants the opportunity to freely express themselves in writing on many topics, which thus provided rich information. The study design is not without its limitations, however. Due to the focus on learning from Mexican-origin students who had achieved the success of college enrollment, other individuals were excluded from the sample. It is likely that a sample of Mexican-origin adolescents deemed to be successful based on some other indicator besides college enrollment would have yielded important and distinct findings from the study sample; this is an important direction for future research. In addition, many of the participants spoke Spanish fluently, however, the survey was only written in English. Therefore, it is possible that responses may have varied for some participants had they been given the opportunity to respond in Spanish. Lastly, the recruitment of the participants was not random. The participants were recruited via a cultural center that supports Latino students at the university where the study was conducted; thus, there was no possibility of recruiting more disenfranchised students who were not formally connected with the Latino student population and may have had distinct adjustment experiences.

Overall, this qualitative study confirms the value of bicultural adjustment that has been examined in large-scale quantitative studies (Birman, 1998; Iturbide et al., 2009; Schwartz et al., 2013; Scwartz et al., 2012; Yang et al., 2009). In addition, the study highlights in more depth some of the features of biculturalism that facilitate adjustment from the perspective of young adults who have gone through it. The findings regarding cultural pride, bicultural identity building factors, and advice for newly arrived immigrants demonstrate strategies and opportunities to promote social and academic success for newcomers. Alegria (2009) emphasizes the importance of learning about how the acculturation process happens for different groups and in different contexts; the participants' responses regarding what advanced or influenced their adjustment process can help assist others in creating bicultural identities to adjust in American society. Educational institutions can better serve the needs of these students by having knowledge that English-language learning, friends, teachers, parents, counselors, mentors, tutors, school programs, and bilingual schools can help Mexican-origin students adjust in school and in American society. From the responses of the participants it appears that the combinations of family support, Mexican friendships, American friendships, and bicultural friendships comprise strong social networks in American society that help Mexican-origin students adjust into American society.

Finally, the advice given by the participants about how to best adjust in American society communicated the value participants placed on being bilingual and achieving a balance between Mexican and American identities. This information contributes to the understanding of the adjustment process, and can also be used by community and educational institutions to help alleviate some of the stress and depression often experienced by Mexican immigrants when migrating and adjusting in American society. For instance, organizations could take such actions such as hiring more bilingual teachers and tutors, creating more bilingual programs, and engaging passionate bicultural mentors. This study can also serve as a guide of sorts for other

ethnic minority adolescents as to what helped others to become socially and academically successful in American society.

Future research on the adjustment process of Mexican-origin adolescents should compare the experiences of first-generation Mexicans adolescents (born in Mexico) to those of second and later generation adolescents to see if there are significant differences. This study examined both groups together and did not have sufficient sample size to explore the differences between the two. Moreover, future research can concentrate on the difference the immigrations status of an individual makes in the adjustment process. Due to their enrollment in an American university and the fact that all participants' parents live in the U.S., the foreign-born participants in the study sample are likely to be legal immigrants; however, it would be important to investigate how an individual's immigration status might facilitate or inhibit the adjustment process. In addition, future research should explore the experiences and perspectives of other ethnic minority groups. Investigation of the adjustment of different origin groups would further advance the understanding of the value of biculturalism and how the adjustment process may vary by ethnic origin.

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**Kyle Anne Nelson** is Assistant Professor in the Department of Sociology at the University of Northern Colorado (United States)

**Michel Infante** is Community Support Coordinator at the Family and Intercultural Resource Center (United States)

**Contact Address:** Direct correspondence to Kyle Anne Nelson at Department of Sociology, University of Northern Colorado, 2040 Candelaria, Campus Box 142, -80639- Greeley, CO, United States. E-mail: kyle.nelson@unco.edu

# Public Intellectuals, Scholars, Journalists, & Activism: Wearing Different Hats and Juggling Different Ethical Mandates

Chip Berlet[1]

1) Research for Progress. United States

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# Public Intellectuals, Scholars, Journalists, & Activism: Wearing Different Hats and Juggling Different Ethical Mandates

Chip Berlet
*Research for Progress*

## Abstract

In democratic civil society a public intellectual can spark deep conversations about disparities of privilege and power. This brings with it the need to be intentional about ethics. The author reviews different roles in which he has been cast where he has played the role of a "public intellectual". The different hats he has worn include scholar, journalist, paralegal investigator, and leftwing movement activist. In each case, there were normative or at least expected ethical boundaries which usually varied by project and sometimes conflicted with other roles. After exploring the different roles and related ethical issues, there is a discussion from a progressive perspective of basic ethical mandates and tools for building human rights. An extensive set of references is provided to assist researchers.

**Keywords:** ethics, activism, subject research, professional standards, principles of unity

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# Intelectuales Públicos, Académicos, Periodistas y Activismo: Llevar Diferentes Sombreros y Manejando Diferentes Mandatos Éticos

Chip Berlet
*Research for Progress*

**Resumen**

En una sociedad civil democrática un público intelectual puede generar conversaciones sobre las disparidades de privilegios y poder. Esto conlleva la necesidad de ser intencionales en cuanto a la ética. El autor revisa diferentes roles que ha desempeñado en los que ha jugado el rol de "intelectual público". Los diferentes roles que ha jugado incluyen al académico, al investigador jurídico, y al activista de izquierdas. En cada caso, había normativa, o al menos unas fronteras éticas esperadas, que usualmente variaban según el proyecto y a veces chocaban con otros roles. Después de explorar los diferentes roles y los aspectos éticos relacionados, se discute desde una perspectiva progresiva de los básicos mandatos éticos y herramientas para construir los derechos humanos. Se proporcionan un conjunto extenso de referencias para asistir a los investigadores.

**Palabras clave:** ética, activismo, sujeto de investigación, estándares profesionales, principios de unidad

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**I** am not a sociologist but I play one on TV. I hold no academic degrees, but for the past 20 years I have been writing scholarly essays (Berlet, 2013a). As a result, I have been quoted in and appeared on corporate and alternative media, speaking on subjects such as right-wing social movements, political repression, prejudice, apocalypticism, terrorism, and other matters that involve sociological research. Before my metamorphosis into a scholar I spent decades as a progressive activist and investigative journalist. Trodding those paths I gained a reputation as someone who thought about ethics and wrote about occurrences of principled and unprincipled behavior by political, business, and religious leaders. This in turn led to many conversations with others across the political spectrum. I listened, learned, took notes, and wrote essays. I moved from premature curmudgeon to "expert" simply by getting older. Direct all credit to my allies and all criticisms to me.

As a form of self-disclosure, I identify myself as a radical Christian and democratic socialist working as part of a progressive global human rights movement. In my work I employ a form of sociological cultural Marxism, engage in "Power Structure Research" (Berlet, 2013e); and use an analytical lens that sees race, gender, and class as "omnipresent in the background of all forms of collective action" (Buechler, 2000). I strive to be a "bad subject" in the Althusserian sense by exposing and challenging ideologies, systems, institutions, and structures of oppression and repression that buttress unfair hierarchies of power and privilege (Althusser & Brewster, 1971/2001; Gray, 2005; Macherey & Bundy, 2013).

Public intellectuals can play a key role in building democracy and civil society and extending human rights. I take that seriously as a responsibility. In this essay I will outline the differences and conflicts in the ethical standards involved in the work I do; which varies based on what social role I am playing at any given moment. Since this essay began as a presentation at a panel discussion, I will alert readers to my penchant for theatrical aspects of public speaking –including my frequent use of various props and stage magic- described here in bracketed comments. In my work over the years I find myself wearing different hats. [At this point I pointed to the baseball hat I was wearing, advertising the "Social Movement Study Network" (2013),

which is a website I curate to help link academics and their students to reliable movement group research and resources].

How did I get picked to be on a panel addressing sociologists as public intellectuals? Some background will set the stage. My participation in social movements began in the 1960s, which were a tumultuous and fluid time. In 1964 I was passing out flyers for the Presidential campaign of the arch-conservative Republican Party candidate Barry Goldwater. A few years later I was marching in the streets with the Civil Rights movement. When I entered college in 1968 I became active in the movement against the war in Vietnam. So I moved from Right to Left. While ostensibly studying sociology and mass media at the University of Denver I began working on the campus student newspaper, eventually becoming editor. After a moving antiwar speech by my professor and mentor John Rice (former US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's father) –I dropped out of college to join the antiwar movement (Berlet, 2004).Gravitating toward the alternative press, I eventually was named to the governing board of the Underground Press Syndicate.

Over the next 20 years I worked with civil rights, antiwar, community, labor, civil liberties, and anti-racist groups on local and then national levels. In the mid 1970s my wife Karen Moyer, and I moved into a predominantly White working class neighborhood in Chicago where racial tensions spilled over into violence against Black families integrating the area. We worked with a multi-racial progressive community group the Southwest Community Congress. In 1981 I was employed part-time at what became the progressive fight-the-right research center Political Research Associates (2013) founded by Professor Jean Hardisty. In the late 1980s, after we moved PRA to the Boston area, I was abducted by radical sociologists who asked me to write scholarly conference papers and later journal articles and book chapters about right-wing social movements.

## Public Intellectuals

Now I am identified as a publi –or at least publicize- intellectual who uses sociological insights in my work. I am honored to be asked to write about what I have learned, especially since there are so many activists and scholars

who have been my teachers, including those on the panel with me: Kathleen Blee, Francis Fox Piven, and Amy Stone. There are also many others who have blended progressive political activism with scholarship. Among them are Gary Delgado, Sara Diamond, Marshal Ganz, William A. Gamson, Jean Hardisty, Douglass Kellner, and Charlotte Ryan. Ganz even has an online training course for organizers (2013).

Being a public intellectual who is part of the progressive movement for social change in the United States can complicate my ethical considerations. I first became a nationally-known expert on right-wing groups in June of 1983 when reporters contacted me about the militant right-wing anti-regime movement known as the "*Posse Comitatus*", which was a predecessor movement of the armed citizens militias. There had been a shootout between one of the *Posse Comitatus* leaders, Gordon Kahl, and law enforcement, which left several people dead and wounded. Kahl escaped, went underground, and was killed in a gun battle with authorities (Corcoran, 1990; Lamy, 1996). In Patriot movement jargon the name "*Posse Comitatus*" takes a standard legal concept in Latin about state power derived from the people. This is turned into a bogus theory claiming the improper and repressive use of federal authority.

I was working in Chicago at a small progressive think tank, Midwest Research, founded by Professor Hardisty who had left academia to study right-wing movements. Several reporters found a reference to me and my knowledge of the *Posse Comitatus* in a pre-Internet news database. The NBC television network morning news program, the *Today Show*, invited me to New York to discuss the *Posse Comitatus* in a live interview. Jean Hardisty and I discussed our obligations as movement activists to highlight the collapsed economy of the farm belt. We were working with progressive farm organizers such as Merle Hansen of the North American Farm Alliance who were competing with the *Posse Comitatus* for recruits among beleaguered farm families struggling with harsh economic realities and structural "adjustments".

We decided that I would agree to the interview only if I could bring a farmer. It was as if I was asking to bring a talking onion. [At this point I placed a large yellow onion on the podium]. The *Today Show* producers were flabbergasted. I held out. The producers relented. The farmer who

appeared was terrific. Here I tip my hat to the Power Devaluation theory of Rory McVeigh (2009) which explains why right-wing movements can grow in both boom and bust cycles.

The next year, in 1984, when civil rights activist Jesse Jackson toured the farm belt for his Presidential campaign, some of the people who organized on his behalf were affiliated with the *Posse Comitatus* and similar anti-regime right-wing groups. Those of us on the Left knew who they were, and they knew who we werewe all kept our mouths shut. This was not ethical in terms of journalism. But it was ethical in terms of the movement idea of principles of unity for tactical rather than strategic coalitions (Berlet, 2013d).

My high point for visibility as a public intellectual was when I was retained by the Cable News Network (CNN) as their expert on right-wing violence in the days following the bombing of the Oklahoma Federal Building in 1995. I hasten to explain that I was way down the list of customary national experts, but many well-known talking heads at the top of the list were journalistically guillotined after they wrongly blamed Muslims for the terrorist act. For example, Steven Emerson declared "This was done with the attempt to inflict as many casualties as possible….that is a Middle Eastern trait" (Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting, 2008).The terror bombing was actually carried out by domestic right-wing terrorists (Dyer. J., 1998; Hamm, 1997; Stern, 1996). Later, this high-visibility role as a public intellectual for CNN led to me being subpoenaed as an expert in the resulting murder trial –alas by the defense team for the now convicted and incarcerated bombing accomplice Terry Nichols. Life sometimes gets very complicated.

## Different Hats

What follows are brief descriptions and examples of other ethical issues or questions of core principles I have encountered while wearing different hats.

## Independent Scholar

Since the late 1980s I have written conference papers, book chapters, and journal articles; some of which survived the ordeal of peer review (Berlet, 2013a). When working on scholarly projects I try to abide by the ethical mandates of the academy in general and the American Sociological Association in particular. I am acutely aware of this when I am engaged in subject research. But I nevertheless incorporate into my research and writing some material collected by others not bound by these ethical considerations. I try not to use material I gathered while wearing a different hat unless the information has been published by someone other than just me. Is that sufficient? I hope so. It's thin ice. I worry about it.

Sometimes I engage in "site visits" that involve a pretext in which I do not reveal my identity as a scholar or journalist. This is clearly outside the bounds of ethical disclosure for sociologists at academic institutions and for members of the American Sociological Association. Sociologists including Kathleen Blee (2002), Jerome Himmelstein (1998), and Betty Dobratz and Stephenie Shanks-Miele (1997) are among the scholars who have written about the fine line they dance on when studying right-wing groups that are racist, antisemitic, sexist, or homophobic. One Himmelstein ASA conference paper was titled "All But Sleeping with the Enemy" (1998).

At a discussion hosted by Burt Klandermans and Kathleen Blee at the 1998 annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, several sociologists wondered if there was an ethical problem of interviewing neonazis but not revealing oneself as Jewish or gay or a leftist. Another topic was the difficulty of gathering accurate information from far right groups that routinely misrepresent their views and activities unless the researcher uses some pretense.

Terminology itself raises questions regarding principles and ethics for both scholars and movement intellectuals. Language is loaded with social and political baggage, and an ethical scholar should consider this when writing or speaking. Himmelstein, for example, argues the term "extremism" is at best a characterization that "tells us nothing substantive about the people it labels", and at worst the term "paints a false picture" (Himmelstein, 1998, p. 7). Lyons and I have been critical of the term "extremism" because

we argue it implicitly valorizes the political center which defends the status quo in US society while oppressive systems based on race, gender, and class are allowed to function with little attention (Berlet & Lyons, 1998). A term clearly contentious among both scholars and activists is "hate crime" (Altschiller, 1999; Berlet, 2004; Dyer, CC., 2001; Herek & Berrill, 1992; Jacobs & Potter, 1998; Jakobsen, 1999; Jenness & Broad, 1997; Jenness, Ferber, Grattet, & Short, 1999; Levin & McDevitt, 1996; Whitlock, 2012).

## Paralegal Investigator

A paralegal investigator works under the direct supervision of an attorney, while a licensed private investigator can work for an attorney or directly with a client. I was trained as a paralegal investigator by Eda Gordon and Sheila O'Donnell (a licensed private investigator) of the original Public Eye Network; and attorney Matthew J. Piers, for whom I worked on a lawsuit against illegal government spying in Chicago. In the 1980s I worked on several other lawsuits against government surveillance abuses, or in defense of movement activists enmeshed in legal troubles or harassment (Berlet, 2013b, 2013c).

Working for Piers I did document analysis and deposition preparation on cases against the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Military Intelligence, and the Chicago Police "Red Squad" intelligence unit. In this role there are strict legal ethics. For example I had to sign a legal document swearing under oath I would not divulge to the public the contents of any government documents covered by court protective orders. And I didn't. Yet having read over 100,000 pages of these documents, my writing on government repression is based on solid information that cannot be revealed, but nevertheless shapes and supports my reporting. I believe I walk this ethical tightrope successfully.

Legal ethics can conflict with movement ethics. In 1988 I was asked to review the evidence in a court case filed by the Christic Institute against alleged U.S. government misconduct involving the Contra rebels seeking to overthrow the leftist government of Nicaragua. The plaintiffs were two American journalists involved with progressive movements. My supervisor at Christic was a licensed private investigator. We both agreed there were

serious and substantial deficiencies in both the evidence and legal work in the case. Our first impulse was to go directly to the plaintiffs. Being unsure of the ethics, we contacted an attorney to advise us. He told us that the only ethical conduct would be for us to inform the lead attorneys in the case, and if they chose to do nothing, we had to remain silent. So we did not alert the plaintiffs or the movement groups funneling tens of thousands of dollars to support the case. We agonized over the outcome, which was that the case collapsed when it reached court (Berlet, 1990/1994).

## Investigative Journalist

Wearing this hat I specialize in writing about government repression and right-wing movements that defend systems of oppression based on race, gender, and class. Journalism schools teach ethics, as do several non-academic centers and groups, including Investigative Reporters and Editors, to which I belong. Even within journalism there are debates about the ethical boundaries of investigative reporting especially concerning the appropriateness of using fictitious identities. Over the years I have had di**sc**ussions with other investigative reporters about the stress and ethical boundary issues involved in pretext identity or "undercover" site visits. We even have a term: "Judas Syndrome", about feeling bad because we are aware that we eventually are going to betray the trust of the people we are not just observing, but sitting down with over burgers and a beer.

Another disagreement involves surreptitious audio or video taping – which some states allow with limits and some ban altogether. Is it acceptable for a journalist to arrange a meeting across a nearby state line to be inside a state that allows surreptitious audio or video taping? Do some reporters illegally tape record conversations just in case they feel they need proof and would rather face a judge for illegal taping than have their credibility undermined? All of this is done all the time by reporters, but it is controversial. I confess I have done both.

When reporting on intelligence agencies or using information supplied "not for attribution" or "on background" a journalist needs to assess whether or not they are being used for a nefarious purpose. "Big Stories, Spooky Sources", was an article I wrote for the *Columbia Journalism Review* (1993)

after I saw several colleagues watch their careers implode by being insufficiently skeptical of sources. The ethics here involve the Two Source rule; now often ignored even in corporate or "mainstream" journalism (Power Structure Research, 2014). The growth of the Internet as an information source and the shrinkage of the news cycle from days to minutes have exacerbated this problem. I acknowledge the irony of being a former denizen of the underground press now teaching journalistic ethics to progressive reporters.

## Movement Activist

Over many years I have participated in numerous conversations about strategy and ethics with progressive movement activists. Within social movements there are specific roles, each with a set of ethical standards that vary by group and sometimes the political weather.

## Alternative Journalist

Left movement journalistic ethics should be based on the quote by Amilcar Cabral: "Hide nothing from the masses of our people. Tell no lies. Expose lies whenever they are told. Mask no difficulties, mistakes, failures. Claim no easy victories" (Cabral, 1970).

Journalists working as part of a social or political movement are often expected to adjust or abandon some of the customary ethical standards of corporate journalism. There are sets of standards for being an "alternative journalist" *covering* Left movements, and there are often a different set of expectations for alternative journalists *working inside* Left movements. There was a panel of alternative journalists discussing these issues at the 2012 Left Forum conference in New York City (Gupta, 2012).

In 1994 radical journalists Michael Albert and Lydia Sargent cofounders of Z Magazine and South End Press, established the Z Media Institute (ZMI) "to teach radical politics, media, and organizing skills; the principles and practice of creating non-hierarchical institutions and projects; and a special

emphasis on vision and strategy for social change" Hundreds of progressive media activists have attended ZMI and learned not only the tools of movement activism, but also responsibilities and ethics. Holly Sklar developed a media curriculum to teach young alternative journalists the basics of journalism as a craft, including the norms and ethics. Sklar brought me in to team teach, and after several years I taught the class with sociologist and journalist Abby Scher (Sklar, Berlet, & Scher, 2013). Sociologist Charlotte Ryan also taught media classes, as did alternative radio guru David Barsamian. Other ZMI instructors have included Michael Bronski, Leslie Cagan, Noam Chomsky, Rosa Clemente, Ron Daniels, Barbara Ehrenreich, Amy Goodman, bell hooks, and Danny Schecter.

Movement journalists are sometimes asked to do things that are clearly unethical in terms of corporate journalism. In 1991 then federal judge Clarence Thomas, a Black man with intensely conservative views, was facing nomination hearings for appointment as a Supreme Court Justice. Some left-leaning Black leaders wanted to know if Thomas while in college had spied on campus civil rights or antiwar activists. A member of the Congressional Black Caucus contacted me with this rumor and a request. Senator Teddy Kennedy was willing to ask the FBI to produce any evidence in their possession, but only if an article discussing the possibility appeared in print. I struggled with the ethics of this request, but eventually wrote a short article for the radical *Guardian* newspaper in New York City. I suggested the possibility without revealing the role of the Black activists in generating the article. Senator Kennedy requested and received the FBI information. There was no evidence that Thomas had ever spied on activists for the government. After tumultuous hearings, Thomas took his seat on the Supreme Court. I was castigated publically for having written a shabby article.

When Jean Hardisty hired me she said one investigative journalism practice she wanted me to stop was surreptitious "dumpster diving". This collection of garbage for research purposes is known us practitioners as "Garbology" (Barricade Journalism, 2013).

I pointed out the US Supreme Court had ruled it legal to collect garbage discarded on public property such as the curbside. Hardisty replied that although she was a progressive lesbian-feminist activist she was also a

trained political scientist and there were certain standards. There was one time I went through garbage while at PRA, but only after securing permission from the group moving their offices (Berlet, 1989). The ultra-conservative John Birch Society staff assumed I was a supporter. Was that OK ethically? For journalism it was.

## Movement Media and Publicist

Publicity and media relations are polite terms for "propaganda". This term we used in progressive movements in the 1970s in the way suggested by Bernays: as a form of persuasion (1928). Now, with a wink at sociologists, we sometimes call it "applied framing". Movement media and publicity involves helping develop outreach strategies including the development of frames, slogans, and narratives. Sociologists William Gamson and Charlotte Ryan host the Media Research and Action Project (MRAP) seminar at Boston College where human rights activists bring their media strategies for analysis in front of a panel that includes graduate students (Media Research and Action Project, 2014). Ryan authored the guide *Prime Time Activism* (1991); and with Gamson wrote "Thinking about Elephants: Toward a Dialogue with George Lakoff" (2005).

In 1974 as part of a small single-event collective I helped coordinate publicity for a week-long series of demonstrations by Vietnam Veterans against the War (VVAW) targeting inadequate veterans' benefits and related issues. The plan included staging an escalating series of provocative actions such as sit-ins and posting protest placards on federal buildings. One small group of handicapped veterans in wheelchairs volunteered to chain themselves to the doors of the Veterans Administration building. Our propaganda collective started laying the groundwork and training veterans as spokespeople over a month before the demonstrations. Our goal was to get coverage on the major television network nightly news programs on the last day of the protests. We succeeded. Much of the coverage was sympathetic. Ethics? Well, we were assigned to manipulate the mass media and we chose to break laws; but we pledged not to ever lie or even exaggerate. The vets spoke truth to power (Social Movement Study Network, 2013a).

I took over as chair of the publicity committee for of the Pressman's union in Washington, DC defending the 15 members indicted and put on trial after they trashed the *Washington Post* pressroom while walking out strike (Social Movement Study Network, 2013b). Our task on the publicity committee was to manipulate the mass media by creating news with press releases and staged events. All of this was to shift public opinion and create a less hostile perception, especially among potential jurors. I practiced no balanced point of view, certainly no objectivity – whatever that means – but clearly I did not explore both sides of the conflict in the press releases I wrote or the slogans I helped frame and then field tested for response. I was biased, and by ASA standards, probably unethical. That's the task, however, of propagandists engaged in "applied framing".

**Tactical Opposition Research**

This is seeking to research, expose, and blunt the opposition's short-term plans. The ethics here can be dicey, especially when the researcher is expected to allow the data to be exaggerated or hyped by movement leaders. Just say no is good advice, but alas, it is often ignored by leadership looking for headlines.

I did tactical opposition research for the SCC in Chicago. My assignment was studying how neonazis and organized white supremacists interacted with and influenced local organizations and individuals who tolerated or promoted a "Whites-Only" neighborhood concept, and other forces that impeded racial justice –including the local police (Berlet, 2001). I used journalistic ethics for most of the research and movement ethics for strategy discussions with the leadership of SCC and its allies. Here I give a tip of my hat to Doug McAdam whose book on political opportunity structures and political processes was so useful that after reading it I helped refocus our strategies and tactics within SCC (McAdam, 1982).

While important and useful for social movements, tactical opposition research tends to be used by political parties and candidates to generate donations rather than build social movement organizations for actual social change. To me that poses an ethical dilemma for people raising funds to

"Fight the Right" in the United States who then funnel that money into appendages of the Democratic Party. The organized Right in the United States invested in a large and diverse set of social movement organizations to pull the Republican Party in their direction rather than serve as an outreach arm of the political party.

**Strategic Movement Research**

This involves serious long-term research into trends in opposition institutions and organizations. It can be overt or covert. Primarily this involves doing "deep reading" of the materials produced by opposition groups looking for patterns and trends that reveal what may turn into a project tactic or strategy. The purpose of this is to assist movement leaders in developing effective counter-strategies as early as possible.

An example of this is the important strategic research of Surina Khan while she was at Political Research Associates (PRA) in the 1990s. Khan was reading deeply into the work of groups that opposed gay rights, and detected a shift in rhetoric. It took her weeks of further research to figure out how a new frame was being tested by anti-gay forces. The result was the report *Calculated Compassion* (Khan, 1998). It was very useful to groups organizing for gay rights, allowing them to anticipate the changing frame of the antigay movement and develop countermeasures.

In 1994 a number of us were studying the growth of the right-wing anti-regime "armed citizens militia" movement (Berlet & Lyons, 2000; Ward, 1996, 1997, 1998; Zeskind, 2009). We suspected their anger would generate violence. A national meeting of researchers in the Pacific Northwest resulted in a warning that likely targets included government buildings, reproductive rights centers, gay rights groups, and people organizing for immigrant rights. Ken Stern of the American Jewish Committee, (who attended the meeting) wrote a memo warning the federal government (Stern, 1996). The rest of us sent out warnings to our constituencies. In December 1994 John Salvi, a militia devotee, attacked reproductive rights centers in Boston (Berlet & Lyons, 2000, p. 297-299). In April 1995 Timothy McVeigh, a neonazi and Terry Nichols, a militia movement participant, blew up the Oklahoma City

Federal Building, killing 168 and injuring many more (Berlet & Lyons, 2000; Levitas, 2002; Stern, 1996; Zeskind, 2009).

**Undercover Work**

Strategic research extends as far as doing undercover work to evaluate and thus help confront attempts to derail progressive dissent. This work is secretive during the investigative phase. The targets of inspection can include government agencies or non-government organizations. I did this type of work originally with the Public Eye Network in the 1970s, which was studying and challenging government surveillance and repression (Public Eye Network, 2012).

Sometimes in both tactical and strategic research work I find myself far distant from the ethical mandates of the American Sociological Association on subject research. For instance I did not notify my subjects of study when I was posing as a potential recruit attending meetings of neonazis, Holocaust deniers, the neofascist LaRouchite cult, and white supremacists in the 1970s and 1980s.

Another example of ethical juggling is when the environmental group Greenpeace sent me undercover to a meeting of the American Society of Industrial Security. I went posing as a facility security specialist complete with phony business cards. My task was to ask various security firms what they thought of Greenpeace. "Harmless but annoying" some said. Others leaned over and quietly warned me that Greenpeace was funded by Moscow and a den of potential terrorists (Berlet, 1990).

To track organizing against reproductive rights and gay rights, I attended a meeting of the right-wing patriotic group the John Birch Society. We were watching a movie about the communist menace when the aged 16mm film projector snapped the brittle film. Now, you should know that in the mid-1960s I was that guy in high school who was in the audio-visual club – pushing 16mm movie projectors and audio tape players from classroom to classroom in the days before laptops and cell phones. At the Birch Society meeting I struggled with an ethical dilemma: leave the film broken and mess up the meeting or go over to the projector and fix the problem. I decided to

splice the film and spent the rest of the meeting feeling conflicted –but nonetheless watching the vividly anti-communist film I had always wanted to see.

## Logistics for Demonstrations

I coordinated garbage collection for one of the big Washington, DC antiwar marches in the early 1970s while the Vietnam War still was raging. We all have to start someplace. Later I was promoted to producing mimeographed flyers. It was amusing to watch rally organizers try to balance the number of Leninists and Trotskyists on the podium.

Eventually I helped stage demonstrations in DC at the Capitol building (In support of increasing college student financial aid), the Kennedy Center (for the Washington Post Pressman's union picketing the opening of the film "All the Presidents Men"); the Justice Department and Veterans Administration (VVAW); and various events for the Yippies (Youth International Party) and Zippies (a radical anarchist grouplet that split with the Yippies). I worked as volunteer staff for scores of other demonstrations. Logistics (even in movement groups) is all about checklists. Yet in most cases we took the time to consider matters of principle and ethics.

## Movement Security

This can be as simple as making sure a meeting room, stage, or performance venue is safe and secure. Wearing this hat I worked with teams for field security (for marches and rallies with stages), first aid volunteers, and legal observers. In each role we had conversations about what was appropriate and ethical behavior for the specific event; and the ethical boundaries were fluid, and determined in part by the ideological range of the group coalition.

A movement's opponents sometimes are disruptive or even violent. While coordinating the security for the first US concert by Cuban trumpeter Arturo Sandoval the building was hit by rocks and bottles thrown by anti-Castro demonstrators. Here ethical discussions take place as to when (if

ever) to call the police if a situation gets out of hand. Movement security also involves training activists in what Public Eye Network founder Sheila O'Donnell calls "Common Sense Security", in which basic steps are taken that do not waste time, energy, or funds on elaborate (macho) fetishized security mania (O'Donnell, 1978/2012).

## Ethical Movement Building

### Develop Principles of Unity

Being sensitive to ethical considerations in Left movement work requires attention to several levels of interaction: internal behavior, external relationships, and coalition work. Groups articulate basic principles in a variety of forms: Principles of Unity, Vision Statements, Goals, Mission Statement, History, etc. These types of statements are a guide to normative behavior in a movement group and often shape the frames and narratives developed for use by the group (Berlet, 2013d).

The organization INCITE! describes itself as a "nation-wide network of radical feminists of color working to end violence against women, gender non-conforming, and trans people of color, and our communities. We support each other through direct action, critical dialogue, and grassroots organizing" (2013a). This serves as the group's basic principles of unity. INCITE! Also has a page describing its more detailed principles of unity (2013b). An excellent online collection of statements is from Southerners on New Ground (2013a, 2013b, 2013c).

### Be Agile and Responsive

Sometimes matters of principle intervene in the projected workplan of a movement group. Jean Hardisty was asked to prepare a research study on the development of organized homophobia for the legal team challenging the homophobic Initiative Amendment Two in Colorado. PRA dropped everything for a month of intensive research. Then Hardisty and I flew out to

Colorado to assist the legal team, with Hardisty testifying before the Colorado Supreme Court. Her study was later published as "Constructing Homophobia" and then incorporated into her book, *Mobilizing Resentment* (Hardisty, 1999).

## Don't Stab Your Existing or Potential Allies in the Back

Seriously? Why does this even need to be stated? Because time after time progressive groups have developed and implemented plans that have had harmful or even devastating effects on potential allies.

In Oregon an anti-gay conservative Christian organization placed a homophobic initiative, Measure Nine, on the ballot. The first plan to mobilize voters to block the initiative focused on urging urban voters in two large cities, Portland and Eugene, to reject Measure Nine. But this original framing developed by national "strategists" pitted urban dwellers against rural dwellers in a snarky way. It implied that sophisticated urbanites knew better than to be bigoted against gay people.

The proposed advertising plan would have undermined the work of rural organizers in Oregon and put gay people outside the cities at greater risk. Experienced grassroots leaders in the statewide LGBTQ community blocked the original plan, arguing that it would be better to stand up against Measure Nine in a principled way that built a broader progressive movement in Oregon. And they explained in private strategy meetings that they took this stand as a matter of ethics even if that meant Measure Nine stood a greater chance of passage. In fact, this long-term strategic approach not only stopped Measure Nine, but also helped build future alliances across Oregon (Pharr, 1988, 1996; Stein, 2001).

## Practice Participatory Democracy

Some progressive social movement organizations (SMOs) take the idea of democracy as an internal practice very seriously (Polletta, 2002; Reagon, 1983; Sitrin, 2012; Sitrin & Azzellini, 2013). For too many progressive (SMOs), especially on the national level, this is a claim made to boards and

funders but not a reality in practice. Progressive SMOs regularly burn out their staff. Appeals by directors for staff sacrifices for the "movement" are just another way to increase workload and keep salaries low. There is even a guide for resisting this titled "White Supremacy Culture" (Okun, 2000/2001). The Western States Center has an entire collection of tools and resources for building participatory democracy (2013). I helped start staff unions at the National Student Association and the National Lawyers Guild, and tried to build one at Political Research Associates. This should not be necessary.

There is an especially wide gap in ethics between groups that actually practice collaborative mass democratic engagement versus cadre organizations operating under Leninist principles. How can secretive Leninist cadre organizations have members participate in mass democratic movements and organizations in an ethical manner if the leadership bind their cadre to promote a predetermined Leninist "Party Line" before any mass group discussion? They can't. I base this on the theories of Hannah Arendt in *Totalitarianism* (1951) and extensive personal observations working in mass-based groups alongside members of various Leninist, Stalinist, and Maoist groups.

To engage in truly democratic activity the cadre organization must always release all cadre members from any aspects of "democratic centralism" so they can participate freely in the mass movement discussions and make up their own minds. Perhaps my most controversial essay on movement ethics was the article "Abstaining from Bad Sects" (1999) (in English the title is a pun). Published in the Left movement *Resist* newsletter, my essay received an unusually high number of responses pro and con –and a few denunciations and cancellations.

**Work Across Boundaries**

In the 1990s Suzanne Pharr, Loretta Ross and I convened several national strategy meetings for challenging right-wing backlash movements. We called our informal strategy network the Blue Mountain Working Group and at our first meeting in 1994 we issued "A Call To Defend Democracy And Pluralism" (Blue Mountain Working Group, 1994). These meetings were

attempts to draft broad "principles of unity" for ethical work by researchers, strategists, and activists.

We were alarmed at the way some activists challenging homophobia in the 1990s had created frames and narratives for publicity purposes that insulted and put at risk people based on their multiple and complex racial, gender, and class identities. Progressive movements and groups need to take the time to investigate whether or not their proposed frames, narratives, and actions will do more harm than good in the short term or long term.

The broad issue here is the need for all human rights activists to build bridges across boundaries that divide us; and create coalitions that are truly diverse and democratic (Bonilla-Silva, 2003; Lorde, 1983; Nakagawa et al., 1996; Reagon-Johnson, 1983).


## Leverage Privilege & Celebrity

As a Straight, White, American, Christian, Male (SWACM) with abundant privilege, I have learned to use my status to elevate other voices in my writing to increase diversity of ideas in the public sphere. This concept was taught to me by activists such as Jean Hardisty, Peggy McIntosh, Scott Nakagawa, Suzanne Pharr, Loretta Ross, Urvashi Vaid, and Nikhil Aziz. Their work is chronicled at the Building Human Rights website (2013).

Because my media celebrity after the Oklahoma City bombing briefly gave me high public visibility –I was asked in 1995 by others in the Blue Mountain Working Group to set aside work with Matthew N. Lyons on our book *Right-Wing Populism in America* (2000). Instead, I was asked to pull together and publish an edited volume on challenging right-wing movements that highlighted overlooked voices in the progressive community. I agreed and the result was the edited volume *Eyes Right: Challenging the Right-Wing Backlash* (Berlet, 1995).

The point is to help challenge traditional hierarchies of power and privilege built around race, gender, and class while also leveling organizational hierarchies to achieve more democratic decision-making (Aziz, 1995; McIntosh, 1989; Ross, 2009; Vaid, 1995, 2012). Not a bad principle of unity for the human rights movement (Building Human Rights, 2013).

## Conclusions

There are many discussions and disagreement about ethics and their boundaries in social movements Left and Right, and this is a fruitful area for more social science research. Scholars and social movement activists exist in a symbiotic relationship. I attend meetings of the American Sociological Association in part to bring back new ideas and research discoveries to progressive movement leaders so we can be more effective. On a national level there are dozens of us who engage in progressive movement tactical and strategic research who benefit from social science research. We are scattered across the country as individuals and as staff working at groups such as Political Research Associates, Data Center, Project South, Center for New Community, Applied Research Center, Highlander Center, and many more. All of these groups are underfunded. Several similar groups have shut their doors due to lack of funding over the past 20 years. When members of the group Incite! point out that the "Revolution Will Not Be Funded" (2007) they are making a salient point about all forms of nonviolent radical social change that seeks to rip up the roots of inequality, oppression, and greed (Berlet, 2005).

Every few years I sit down and reread Hanna Arendt's *Eichmann in Jerusalem* (1963) to remind myself of the obligations of a human rights activist participating in building a truly democratic civil society. According to William H. Hastie, the first Black federal judge in the United States, "Democracy is a process, not a static condition. It is becoming rather than being. It can easily be lost, but never is fully won. Its essence is eternal struggle" (Hastie n.d., as cited in Facing History and Ourselves, 2011). Democracy, therefore, is not a specific set of institutions that can be exported to different nations –and certainly not when delivered by drones. Democracy is an ongoing process rooted in the unique culture of a society, and which involves several components, all of which are necessary, but none of which is sufficient. This is how it works in my view:

The majority of people,
Over time,

> Given access to enough accurate information,
> And the ability to participate in a free and open debate,
> Reach decisions that will benefit the whole of society, and also:
>> Preserve liberty,
>> Protect freedom,
>> Extend equality, and
>> Defend democracy.

With scholar and progressive activist and strategist Frances Fox-Piven on the panel I would like to end with a tip of the hat to her for putting up with all the abuse, red-baiting, and general defamation from right-wing demagogues over the past few years. They wave a red flag to get attention. [I begin to wave a red handkerchief in the air] but we all know that this rightist rhetoric is a red herring to divert attention from the unfair power and privilege of wealthy elites. [Here the red handkerchief magically turns into a wealthy elitist's four-foot-long walking stick].

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**Chip Berlet** is an independent scholar affiliated with Research for Progress (United States)

**Contact Address:** E-mail: c.berlet@researchforprogress.org

# Performance of Banking Sectors Due to Adoption of Information Technology (IT)

Ajay Kumar Behera[1], Narayan C. Nayak[2] and Harish C. Das[1]

1) Siksha O Anusandhan University. India
2) Indira Gandhi Institute of Technology. India

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# Performance of Banking Sectors Due to Adoption of Information Technology (IT)

Ajay Kumar Behera
*Siksha O Anusandhan University*

Narayan C. Nayak
*Indira Gandhi Institute of Technology*

Harish C. Das
*Siksha O Anusandhan University*

## Abstract

The aim of this paper is to provide an analysis on the relationship between Information Technology (IT) usage, CRM and performance of bank (state bank group) in Bhubaneswar, Odisha, India. Most of the banks in INDIA are geared for comprehensive banking solutions with extensive branch networks. Empirical data collection was done in the year 2012 and analyzed with the theoretical data. A sample of 18 branches was selected using the non-probability sampling technique. Perceptions of branch managers, staff members and customers were collected using a survey method. All 18 branches selected are of an equivalent grade according to the grading set by the bank. Three different types of questionnaires were designed for branch managers, branch staff and customers. Both structured and semi structured questions were included in the questionnaires with 7 point likert scale. Using bivariate correlation and linear regression, data analysis was done. The linear relationship between variables was measured by using Pearson's correlation coefficient. The analysis suggested that IT usage has a positive linear relationship with financial performance and quality performance of bank branches. Bank performance was found to have a correlation with factors such as staff attitude towards IT usage, IT literacy level of bank staff and scope and complexity of the IT applications.

**Keywords:** Information technology usage, bank performance, quality performance, IT literacy level, financial performance

# Productividad del Sector Bancario Debida al Uso de Tecnologías de la Información (TI)

Ajay Kumar Behera
*Siksha O Anusandhan University*

Narayan C. Nayak
*Indira Gandhi Institute of Technology*

Harish C. Das
*Siksha O Anusandhan University*

## Resumen

El objetivo de este artículo es proporcionar un análisis de la relación entre el uso de Tecnologías de la Información (TI), CRM y la productividad de los bancos (grupo estatal de bancos) en Bhubaneswar, Odisha, India. La mayoría de los bancos en India están diseñados para aplicar soluciones comprehensivas a partir de redes extensas de sucursales. La recolección de datos empíricos se hizo en 2012 y se analizó desde la teoría. Se seleccionó una muestra de dieciocho sucursales a partir de una técnica de muestreo no probabilístico. Mediante una encuesta se recogió la percepción de directores, personal y clientes de las sucursales. En los cuestionarios de escalas de Likert de siete puntos se incluyeron tanto preguntas estructuradas como semiestructuradas. El análisis se realizó en base a correlaciones bivariadas y regresiones lineales. La relación linear entre las variables se midió con un coeficiente de correlación de Pearson. El análisis sugirió que el uso de TI tiene relación lineal directa con la productividad financiera y con una productividad de calidad de las sucursales bancarias. Se halló que la productividad de los bancos correlaciona con factores cómo la actitud de los trabajadores hacia las TI, su grado de alfabetización en TI y el alcance y complejidad de las aplicaciones de TI.

**Palabras clave:** uso de tecnologías de la información, productividad de los bancos, grado de alfabetización en TI, productividad financiera, CRM

## Introduction

**I**nformation Technology (IT) is fast becoming a dynamic channel that drives the Indian economy. IT is becoming increasingly important for the growth of our economy as a whole. The availability and usage of adequate IT skills are important factors, which influence the competitiveness among commercial banks in this era of e-Economy.

There are multiple factors which govern the performance of an organization. Of those, IT has a significant positive impact on the organizational performance (O'Mahony & Robinson, 2003). Growth and competitiveness of banks are dependent on the successful application of new technologies. Availability of skilled labor is a questionable resource requirement. There is a qualitative and quantitative imbalance in the supply of skilled labor. It depends on the demographic factors, business cycles and rapid technological advancements taking place around us. Due to the vast development in the area of e-Banking it is essential that the policy makers should focus on the growing demand in IT skills and take corrective steps to prepare the required numbers and quality beforehand. e-Banking enables to conduct banking business electronically over the Internet where the costs are minimal and it is no longer bound by time or geographical boundary.

How can the Indian banks keep abreast of these changes? How can the banks stay ahead and introduce next generation of banking products? The answers to these questions would be to have employees fluent in digital language and people who are innovative and creative. They should be capable in introducing new banking products and understanding the future banking needs of our society. This research provides information to the stakeholders of commercial banks to allocate required funds for the much-needed IT training on employees. Further, IT literacy level of the decision makers has a huge impact on the total customer satisfaction and thereby achieving growth in performance.

There were many constraints and hardships experienced by bank branches in the era of pre-IT usage. The total number of accounts handled manually by branches with the allocated staff members was limited. Hence the opening of new accounts was restricted in most of the high level

branches. Today there is no restriction as such and systems allow the opening of any number of accounts. Before the implementation of Automatic Teller Machines (ATMs) customers had to visit their own branch to withdraw cash. Anytime banking was not available. Unavailability of any-where banking features was due to the unavailability of ATM banking, Internet banking, SMS and phone banking. Branches were opened only during the specified time durations. Banking hours were restricted. Branch staff could not leave the branch until they balance their day's accounting. In some instances, balancing was extended to late nights. Daily balancing, month-end balancing and year-end balancing were tedious tasks to operational staff of the branch. Branches had to offer more restricted ban king hours during such periods.

If a customer wanted to withdraw money from his savings account, he had to fill a savings debit form, present it to the cashier, obtain a token and wait till the number is called. When the token number is called, he had to place the signature again on the same debit voucher confirming cash receipt from the cashier. Accordingly he had to visit the cashier at least twice to receive his own money. There were no single point transactions. Branch staff had to check signatures, mandates and ledger sheets and they need to make necessary entries manually before disbursing or after accepting cash from customers. There were long waiting queues at branches on special days when the branch staff could not handle the workload. Fund transfer between two accounts belonging to separate branches or banks was a complicated task and it took several days to effect the transaction. Reconciliation of main accounts took many days and they were usually two to three days behind. Extraction of past records was a task of searching through huge paper files and documents. But today, a customer can receive cash from the branch teller at the first appearance. Tellers are given authority to pay up to a higher level without seeking officers approval. Tellers can review all the information on-line using the teller terminals before taking decisions. Debit voucher forms are validated on- line using teller printers.

Customer advices and statements were type written. Even the balance inquiry was a complex task. Job expertise was a mandatory requirement to work at the branch. Customers were given lengthy account numbers as the

branch codes and ledger numbers were incorporated in account numbers for easy identification. There was no easy way to extract instant ad-hoc MIS reports for decision-making. There were no cashless shopping, marketing or holidaying. People had to carry cash with them. Credit cards and debit cards were not available.

Banks are spending huge sums of money in acquiring IT competence. They need to invest huge amounts in foreign currency for hardware, software and soft skills. Also they invest money to train bank staff and maintain and retain the group of knowledge workers. Do the banks gain the expected return on expenditure? Have they achieved the maximum value for the money spent? Do they have a specific plan to collect the return? Also, does the bank prepare its entire staff to accept IT challenges and innovations ahead?

The main objective of this research is to find out the impact of IT usage on bank performance. With respect to a leading commercial bank in India, this study attempts to measure the impact of IT usage on bank performance. It also tries to find out the level of IT usage at branches. Further the study attempts to explore the IT literacy level of banking staff.

The research was carried out within a set of sample branches belonging to state bank group involved in commercial banking business in Bhubaneswar, Odisha, India.

There are many factors governing the overall performance of banks. It is necessary to study all the factors and their effectiveness on the performance. In this era of e-Banking IT definitely plays a major role in performance. Almost all the banks in India geared with complex IT systems to handle core-banking functionalities. Branches use those functionalities provided by the central core banking applications. However, the usage of IT at the branch, other than the core banking application is to be studied. Also it is necessary to motivate and encourage branch managers and the staff to be equipped with IT skills to use IT in a broader way.

The results of this research will enable the banks to take corrective decisions on fund allocations for IT training of their staff. They can include alterations to the recruitment and promotion criteria to consider IT skill levels. This can result in making it a general requirement to acquire IT skills for employment in the banking industry. This will also create

awareness in the general public that it is important to acquire basic IT skills before seeking employment. Finally, it can contribute in turn to improve the IT literacy level of the general public.

If banks are willing to include IT literacy skills in the performance evaluation and promotion criteria, it will be an added motivation for the existing bank staff to acquire required IT skills. When the branch staff is IT literate, they can propose and suggest innovative banking products which align with banking business. It will be easy for the specialized IT staff to have fruitful discussions during policy reforms.

IT is a main factor which influences globalization. Globalization is a 'social process'. Various companies from different countries with different cultural values and ideas tend to converge together. Business and society as a whole rely heavily on IT. IT is a means to communicate data and valuable information that is used in organizational processes for crucial decision making. With the development of the Internet there is an increased opportunity enabling organizations to succeed financially (Jun & Cai, 2001). IT has become an essential resource to business activities due to the development of high bandwidth telecommunications networking, integrated distribution systems, and database systems that allow businesses to operate in a global way. IT enables communication between different companies via state-of-the-art technology, consisting of telecommunications equipments such as high-tech web cameras and ultra-fast networks, resulting in high-speed data transmission1.

Now that many firms around the world have taken to globalization through IT, it has caused an increase in competition. As a result there is a benefit to the consumer. The prices set on the Internet are frequently lower than the prices set in retail stores (Cui, Lewis, & Park, 2003). In the book 'The Search' (Dewhurst, Lorente, & Rodrigues, 2003) Battelle explained how the search engine 'Google' and its rivals changed the rules of traditional business and transformed our global culture.

Assessment of IT literacy means not just knowledge of technology, but the ability to apply technology to solve problems (Needle, 2006). Findings of an e-skills study of IT user skills in workplace in the UK demonstrated very bad gaps for employees. The study has found that many employees lacked sufficient IT user skills to perform effectively in their day-to-day

roles thus impacting negative business productivity (Oliver & Towers, 2000).

Aim of Customer Relationship Management (CRM) is to produce Customer Equity. Three major drivers of customer equity are: 1. Value Equity 2. Brand Equity 3.Relationship Equity



Figure 1. *Supply chain of SBI  Finance*

Electronic Vendor Financing Scheme (e-VFS ) and Electronic Dealer Financing Scheme (e-DFS) State Bank of India introduces Supply Chain Finance by leveraging its state of the art technology for the convenience of the customers. SCF will strengthen the relationship of SBI with the Corporate World by financing their supply chain partners. Under Supply Chain Finance Unit we have established an online platform for financing the Supply Chain partners of various reputed Corporate. The paper has established the relationship between CRM, IT usage & IT literacy level.

Dramatic changes are happening in financial products and services. Other than the traditional banking business of liquidity provision, banks have acquired competencies to perform variety of other financial and non-financial activities. Deregulation and innovation have opened up the financial sector. Bankers must ensure that they are ready for this technological change (Rockman, 2005).

The drive towards self-service and automated customer care has allowed organizations to reduce costs and handle an ever-increasing number of consumer transactions efficiently. However, the profile of end customer is ever changing. They are becoming mobile and not relying on a single communication device. Companies should grasp this and maintain a competitive edge. They should recognize the growing user-centricity of consumer communications (Berger, 2008).

The paradigm is shifting. The organizations that can move quickly to respond to this change can gain a bigger market share and reduce customer churn purely by enhancing the experience of customers who now expect anytime, anywhere access to services (Berger, 2008). A research carried out in the UK has used the "Growth Accounting Approach" to multi factor productivity estimation to estimate the impact of IT on productivity (O'Mahony & Robinson, 2003). Identification of suitable metrics to assess IT impact on business performance is a difficult task. Further work have to be carried out to determine whether measures such as IT usage, user satisfaction could be used as an indicator of business performance attributed to the use of IT in a competent and innovative way (Mutula & Brake, 2007).

There are many factors governing the performance of decision-making units that are to be considered in benchmarking (Mutula & Brake, 2007). Some of them can be listed as customer attitude towards IT usage, scope of IT applications used, level of IT service quality, IT security level, complexity of IT, unreliability of IT, job satisfaction of the staff, profitability, considering IT as a strategic tool, level of customer relationship management, customer satisfaction, cost reduction, operational efficiency and operating efficiency. A study done on comparison of service quality states that the IT usage on branch performance can be measured using the use of the Internet as a marketing intelligence tool, perceived usefulness and perceived ease of use, system quality (information quality), attitudes towards web retailing, compatibility, personality, working experience, educational level, Internet access availability, training received and frequency of use and trust (Rajan, 1996).

In a research done by Davis (Gaffney, 2007) in 1989 using the Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) as a basis, a questionnaire was completed by employees. Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) was used to analyze the data, and this confirmed the relationships proposed by the TAM (Gaffney, 2007). In that research, the TAM was modified and applied to bank customers in Estonia, because Estonia, a country with a developing economy, has focused on Internet banking as an important distribution channel. A total of 268 commercial bank customers responded to a Greek and Turkish translated version of the SERVQUAL (a multiple-item scale for measuring perceptions of service quality instrument) (Arasli, 2005).

## Methodology

The research was carried out on quantitative design to measure IT usage level at branches. Interviews were carried out to collect data from key stakeholders in the banking sector who are also with IT expertise. Functionalities that the branch staff can perform using IT skills in order to increase the bank performance were analyzed by conducting interviews with industry experts. A sample set of branches were selected for the survey. Three types of questionnaires were prepared and distributed among the branch managers, staff and customers.

In order to measure the branch performance, the following channels were used to acquire data: Published data, Customer views, Interviews with veteran bankers, Interviews with bank staff, Results obtained from the questionnaire.

Branch performance was measured in two ways such as quality performance and financial performance. Based on the previous literature, those two performances were measured using multiple sets of variables as explained in Table 1.

Table 1.
*Variables used to measure branch performance*

| Financial Performance (FP) | |
|---|---|
| 1 | Total deposits |
| 2 | Total advances |
| 3 | Branch profit |
| Quality Performance (QP) | |
| 1 | Customer attitude on branch performance |
| 2 | Customer complaints |
| 3 | Job satisfaction of the branch staff |

Data analyzed and presented in descriptive and narrative forms using statistical methods and SPSS (Statistical Package for Social Sciences) and finally the impact of IT usage on bank performance was measured.

Table 2.
*Variables used to measure IT usage at branches*

| IT Application (Application) | |
|---|---|
| 1 | Scope of IT applications |
| 2 | Availability of Internet |
| 3 | ATM availability |
| 4 | Level of e-mail communication |
| 5 | Level of office package usage |
| Attitude Towards IT (Attitude) | |
| 1 | Attitude of branch managers towards IT usage |
| 2 | Attitude of branch staff towards IT usage |
| 3 | Attitude of customers towards IT usage |
| IT Literacy Level (Literacy) | |
| 1 | IT literacy level of manager |
| | IT literacy level of branch staff |
| 3 | IT literacy level of customer |

## Results

Bank branch performance was the dependent variable in the study. It is measured in two ways such as financial performance and quality

performance of the branch. Independent variables are grouped under IT usage at bank branches. Independent and dependent variables used for the analysis are detailed in Tables 1 and 2.

Pearson's correlation analysis was used to identify the relationships of performance variables with IT usage variables to test the hypothesis. Results obtained are shown in the Tables 3, 4, 5, 6 and Table 7.

Table 3.
*Correlation analysis between IT usage and increase in deposits*

|  | Increase in deposits | Application | Attitude | Literacy |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Increase in Pearson Correlation | 1 | 0.461 | 518(*) | 0.401 |
| Deposits sig. (2-tailed) |  | 0.054 | 0.028 | 0.099 |
| N | 18 | 18 | 18 | 18 |

  *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)

Table 4.
*Correlation analysis between IT usage and increase in advances*

| Variable | Pearson Correlation | Significance (2- tailed) |
|---|---|---|
| Increase in Deposits | | |
| IT Application | 0.461 | 0.054 |
| Attitude towards IT | 0.518(*) | 0.028 |
| IT literacy Level | 0.401 | 0.099 |
| Increase in Advances | | |
| IT Application | 0.459 | 0.055 |
| Attitude towards IT | 0.557(*) | 0.016 |
| IT literacy Level | 0.557(*) | 0.022 |
| Increase in Profit | | |
| IT Application | 0.474(*) | 0.047 |
| Attitude towards IT | 0.661(**) | 0.003 |
| IT literacy Level | 650(**) | 0.003 |
| | | |
| Quality Performance | | |
| IT usage | 727(**) | 0.001 |

*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

Table 5.
*Correlation analysis between IT usage and increase in profit*

|  | Increase in deposits | Application | Attitude | Literacy |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Increase in Pearson Correlation | 1 | 0.474(*) | 0.661(**) | 0.650(**) |
| Deposits sig. (2-tailed) |  | 0.047 | 0.003 | 0.033 |
| N | 18 | 18 | 18 | 18 |

*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

Table 6.
*Correlation analysis between IT usage and increase in profit*

| Correlation Analysis Between IT Usage and Quality Performance | | |
|---|---|---|
|  | QP | IT Usage |
| QP Pearson Corre | 1 | 0.727(**) |
| Sig.(2-tailed) |  | 0.001 |
| N | 18 | 18 |

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

## Hypothesis Testing

The following hypotheses were tested.

### Hypothesis 1

"Higher the IT application at bank branch, higher the impact on increase in branch deposits". Correlation analysis showed that there is no strong relationship. Accepted H0, Rejected H1

**Hypothesis 2**

Greater the positive attitude towards IT, higher the impact on increase in branch deposits at the bank branch". Correlation analysis showed a positive relationship. Rejected H0, Accepted H2

**Hypothesis 3**

"Higher the IT literacy level of branch staff and customers, higher the impact on increase in bank branch deposits". Correlation analysis showed that there is no strong relationship. Accepted H0, Rejected H3

**Hypothesis 4**

"Higher the IT application at bank branch, higher the impact on increase in advances". Correlation analysis showed that there is no strong relationship. Accepted H0, Rejected H4

**Hypothesis 5**

"Greater the positive attitude towards IT, higher the impact on increase in advances at the bank branch". Correlation analysis showed a positive relationship. Rejected H0, Accepted H5

**Hypothesis 6**

"Higher the IT Literacy level of branch staff and customers, higher the impact on increase in bank branch advances". Correlation analysis showed a positive relationship. Rejected H0, Accepted H6

**Hypothesis 7**

"Higher the IT application at bank branch, higher the impact on increase in the branch profit". Correlation analysis showed a positive relationship. Rejected H0, Accepted H7

**Hypothesis 8**

"Greater the positive attitude towards IT, higher the impact on increase in Profit of bank branch". Correlation analysis showed a strong positive relationship. Rejected H0, Accepted H8

**Hypothesis 9**

"Higher the IT Literacy level of the branch staff and the customers, higher the impact on the increase in bank branch profit". Correlation analysis showed a strong positive relationship. Rejected H0, Accepted H9

**Hypothesis 10**

"Higher the IT usage level, higher the impact on Quality Performance improvement at the bank branch". Correlation analysis showed a strong positive relationship. Rejected H0, Accepted H10

## Discussion

There is a significant positive relationship between the attitude of the branch staff plus customers towards the IT usage and the increase in bank performance. There is a weak positive relationship between the IT application and the increase in deposits. The relationship between IT literacy level of the staff and the customers and the increase in branch deposits is also weak. It is noted that this bank could use IT as a marketing intelligence tool to increase deposits.

The relationship between the increase in advances of the branch and the attitudes of the staff plus customers towards IT is significant. Increase in advances with the IT literacy level of staff and customers are also significantly related. However, the IT application has only a weak relationship with the increase in advances of branch. With the use of IT, it was possible to evaluate the customer credit worthiness in granting advances. However, according to the results it can be stated that this bank

was utilizing the power of IT to increase the loan and advance portfolio of the bank. They could get the advantages of data warehousing and data mining to evaluate customers and increase loan portfolio.

All three independent variables listed as IT application, attitude towards IT and IT literacy level have strong relationships with the dependent variable named as increase in branch profit. The relationship with attitude towards IT and IT literacy level is stronger. It is seen that the relationship between IT usage and quality performance of a branch is also significant. Branch staff is able to attend to customer needs in a better way as they could access customer information online. They could verify the signatures online. Total customer profile could be viewed with a single key stroke. IT has made the work easy for the branch staff.

The research study showed that there is a substantial influence of IT usage on the bank performance improvement. In conducting this research it was found that usage levels of IT in the branches differed significantly. Some branches were using IT in many of their business functions whereas in others the IT usage was limited to core banking applications. For example, some branches have not explored the possibility of using e-mail communication with customers to further improve customer service levels and reduce delays in correspondence.

Some of the causes of such differentiation are non availability of Internet and personal computers for the related staff, lack of IT knowledge and poor investments on IT at branch level. Some senior staff members were very comfortable with the way they practiced their work for past 10 to 15 years and not willing to accept changes. It was also stated that some personal computers were very slow in performance. Slowness in Internet browsing was also a concern. Some staff members were complaining about not having Internet access, because managers had the opinion that it is not possible to open Internet for all staff as it can have an adverse effect on normal work.

## Conclusion

The analysis proved that the use of IT has a huge impact on the overall branch profit. Establishment of the core banking application system with on-line inter branch network covering most of the branches in Bhubaneswar has increased the convenience of customers. Anytime banking and anywhere banking has reduced customer visits to his/her own branch.

Most of the customers have not seen the web site of the bank. It is possible to have a display desktop at the reception counter of the branch with bank web site as home page for customer use. It is also necessary to address the issue of bank branch staff not having access to the Internet. Some staff members have not even accessed the web site of the bank.

The IT literacy level of the branch staff can be further improved and facilities should be available at the branch to use IT for branch work. Core banking application to be further strengthened to reduce staff time spent on routine work. Staff should be free to use IT for new avenues such as to enhance the deposit mobilization, the advance portfolio and recovery of non-performing loans.

From the research findings it was revealed that ATM usage is very popular among customers. However, customers are not happy with the level of ATM availability in the country. ATM locations are limited and it is not easy to find another ATM machine when the closest one is not functioning. Banks need to address this issue collectively. Banks can incorporate other functionalities like cash deposits and acceptance of clearing cheques via ATMs. It is necessary to amend and incorporate required legal policies pertaining to these functionalities in order to serve the customer. Bank branches are the critical decision making units of the bank. IT usage can be used to measure benchmark and identify low performing branches.

## Future Work

In future, the entire bank branch networks in India will be equally equipped with latest IT functionalities. Hence the competition will lie on special

attention given to customers by his or her own branch and ultimately it will be the human relationship that will bring back customers and not the technology. It will be mainly the human connection, love and care of serving customers that will attract and retain customers to the branch.

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**Ajay Kumar Behera** is Research Scholar in the Department of Mechanical Engineering at the Siksha O Anusandhan University (India)

**Narayan C. Nayak** is Professor in the Department of Mechanical Engineering at the Indira Ghandi Institute of Technology (India)

**Harish C. Das** is Professor in the Department of Mechanical Engineering at the Siksha O Anusandhan University (India)

**Contact Address:** Send direct correspondence to Ajay Kumar Behera, Plot nº 1501/1679, Khandagiri Bari, Bhubaneswar, Odisha, 751030, India. E-mail: mail2ajaybehera@yahoo.co.in

# Sociología Económica de las Migraciones Internacionales

Noemí Martín Casabona[1]

1) Universidad Rovira i Virgili. España

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# Review

La biografía de Alejandro Portes, nacido en Cuba y ciudadano americano desde 1968, acogido como refugiado político en Estados Unidos, es sin duda una de las razones de su interés por investigar las migraciones internacionales. Portes destaca el crecimiento de la sociología de la inmigración dentro de la perspectiva sociológica de la economía y la necesidad de atender a los significados de ésta.

De este modo, a través de una antología que recoge estudios empíricos y ensayos teóricos de Portes (en ocasiones junto a otros autores y autoras), de impacto científico a nivel internacional, se presentan las innovaciones conceptuales y metodológicas elaboradas por el autor en el proceso de desarrollo de la sociología de la inmigración, vinculada a la dimensión económica.

En el primer artículo, Portes nos sitúa en el contexto de la inmigración mexicana a Estados Unidos, desmintiendo la imagen y las expectativas convencionales que se otorgan a la inmigración ilegal y asumiendo que la principal motivación de dicha inmigración es económica.

El segundo artículo supone una contribución a la sociología económica a partir de la revisión del concepto de incrustación social y, más concretamente, desde el análisis y la redefinición del concepto de capital social, con el fin de determinar cómo la acción económica puede verse afectada desde las estructuras sociales.

Relacionado con el capital social, en el quinto artículo, Portes ofrece una respuesta al resurgimiento contemporáneo del concepto de capital social definido en 1985 por Bourdieu. Así, examina los autores principales

asociados al uso contemporáneo del término y sus enfoques; las fuentes del capital social y las investigaciones recientes relacionadas con los efectos de éste y, por último, sus consecuencias y efectos negativos.

La teoría del modelo de "asimilación segmentada" se formula por primera vez en el tercer artículo. Centrado en el estudio de los inmigrantes de 2ª generación y las posibilidades y opciones de adaptación de éstos, los autores plantean cuáles son los factores que influyen en este proceso. A partir de tres ejemplos concretos, ilustran que además de variables individuales y familiares, el contexto supone un elemento clave en las vidas de los hijos e hijas de inmigrantes de la 1ª generación.

El artículo cuarto nos sitúa en la Teoría de la Inmigración, donde Portes presenta una reflexión acerca de las problemáticas que debemos asumir en la búsqueda de modelos teóricos, y relata cuatro equivocaciones relacionadas con el abordaje del desarrollo de dicha teoría. A la vez, ofrece las líneas de investigación que pueden servir a este cometido.

En el artículo sexto, Portes resume, en primer lugar, las convergencias teóricas en el estudio del "Transnacionalismo inmigrante", presentando cinco conclusiones consensuadas por los estudiosos de este ámbito. En segundo lugar, el autor aporta evidencias empíricas sobre el estudio de este fenómeno, llegando a la conclusión de que resulta imprescindible una combinación de métodos y una metodología diversificada para avanzar en el estudio del transnacionalismo inmigrante.

El artículo séptimo, por Portes y Shafer, nos sitúa en el concepto de "enclave étnico" definido como formaciones caracterizadas "por la concentración espacial de inmigrantes que organizan una variedad de empresas que atienden tanto a un mercado propio como a la población en general" (Portes, 2012, p. 117), proclamado por Portes y Wilson, en 1980. De este modo, 25 años después, partiendo de las elaboraciones posteriores de Portes y de otros colaboradores y por las polémicas que suscitó el concepto, Portes revisita el enclave cubano en Miami (basado en la experiencia económica de los exiliados cubanos en Miami en los 60 y 70), analizando de nuevo su realidad y el impacto que produjo, y validando el concepto original.

Por último, se presenta el artículo Migración y cambio social: algunas reflexiones conceptuales, en el que Portes analiza la relación entre migración

y cambio social como consecuencia y como causa, partiendo de una concepción de la sociedad compleja y jerárquica, y considerando los factores culturales y estructurales. A la vez, nos remite al legado de las tradiciones ancestrales como herramientas de utilidad para analizar las cuestiones contemporáneas.

En conclusión, esta recopilación de trabajos de Portes y otros autores/as ofrece al lector un compendio de referencias esenciales en la disciplina. Los textos ilustran conceptos claves vinculados al fenómeno de las migraciones internacionales, lo cual debe tomarse en cuenta en la investigación, en el debate y en la concreción de políticas en las actuales sociedades receptoras de personas inmigrantes.

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Noemí Martín Casabona, Universidad Rovira i Virgili
noemi.martin@urv.cat

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